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Abstract:
This thesis focuses on the relationship between Indigenous fiscal autonomy and
self-determination. Indigenous nations’ ability to achieve self-determination is dependent
upon their ability to autonomously finance self-government. Unfortunately, Canada’s
colonial policies have weakened Indigenous economies and rendered them dependent
upon the Crown. Due to Indigenous nations’ lack of fiscal autonomy, Crown policies
designed to promote Indigenous self-government have proven inadequate. This thesis
argues for using the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a
blueprint for developing more equitable economic relations. While there are various
elements to Crown-Indigenous economic relations, this thesis focuses on the distribution
of tax jurisdiction between the federal government and the provinces to the exclusion of
Indigenous nations. Taxation is an important factor in wealth creation and distribution
that can play an integral role in helping Indigenous nations achieve fiscal autonomy.
However, current laws influencing Indigenous taxation rights and exemptions are a
continuation of Canada’s colonization project. Therefore, facilitating Indigenous fiscal
autonomy requires a reassessment of laws influencing taxation rights and exemptions as
they apply to Indigenous nations. This thesis argues for using the principles contained
within the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a blueprint
for developing laws recognizing Indigenous nations inherent right to control tax policy
within their jurisdiction. The recognition of Indigenous nations’ inherent right to control
tax policy within their jurisdiction can be achieved by (1) exempting from federal and
provincial taxation the personal property of members of Indigenous nations, without
qualification; and (2) by signing agreements recognizing Indigenous nations’ inherent
right to tax corporate profits made on Indigenous lands.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction & Background
1.1-Introduction
This thesis begins with a quick note on terminology. The terms used to refer to the
original inhabitants of North America have been evolving with the changing political landscape
in Canada. The Canadian government has made use of the terms “Indian” and “Aboriginal” in
reference to the original inhabitants of North America. These terms are found in legislation, case
law, policy statements and the Constitution.
As part of the process of decolonization, it is necessary to attend to ways in which the
original inhabitants of North America identify and self-define. While still in use, the terms
“Aboriginal” and “Indian” have become outdated. Instead, the term Indigenous is preferred as it
dissociates the identification of Indigenous peoples from colonial law and policy.1
This thesis uses the term “Indigenous” wherever possible to refer to the original
inhabitants of North America. The term “Indigenous nation” will be used to refer to a group of
Indigenous peoples with a shared identity and occupying a particular territory. However, when
referring to cases, legislation, and the Constitution the terms used in those documents will be
used in an effort to minimize confusion.
This thesis encourages Parliament to implement policies and legislation that give
meaningful effect to Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to self-determination and selfgovernment. In order to meaningfully promote Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination
and self-government Canada must promote Indigenous fiscal autonomy by redistributing taxation
rights and exemption in a manner consistent with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights

1

Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, Administrative Law in Context 3rd ed (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 2018) ch
3 (Jenna Promislow & Naomi Metallic) at 88.
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of Indigenous Peoples.2 Indigenous fiscal autonomy is an essential element of meaningful selfgovernment without which Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination cannot be achieved.3
Therefore, this thesis argues for enacting laws which facilitate Indigenous fiscal autonomy.
Facilitating Indigenous fiscal autonomy will help redefine the Indigenous-Crown relationship
from one of dependence to one of cooperation and, therefore, promote self-determination and
self-government.4
Addressing the topic of tax jurisdiction is important not only because it raises issues of
representation and citizenship,5 but also because societies have used taxation to establish control
over lands and people.6 In Canada, the distribution of tax jurisdiction has been used to undermine
Indigenous peoples’ interests in their lands and resources. For example, the Constitution Act,
1982 distributes tax jurisdiction between two orders of government, federal and provincial.7 And

2

Canada, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, The Government of Canada's Approach to
Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government, (Policy) online:
Government of Canada <www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1539869205136#PartI> [Self-government
Policy]. Canada recognizes Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to self-government. However, Canada maintains that
self-government can only be achieved through negotiations.
3
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2 (Ottawa:
Ministry of Supply and Services, 1996) at 290-93 [Report of the Royal Commission].
4
Dean Neu & Richard Therrien, Accounting for Genocide: Canada’s Bureaucratic Assault on Aboriginal People
(Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2003). Currently, Indigenous-Crown relations are overwhelmingly
defined by Indigenous dependence on federal monetary policy. This is a result of years of mismanagement and
outright theft committed by the Crown.
5
John J Borrows & Leonard I Rotman, Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials & Commentary, 5th ed (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2018) at 947 [Borrows, “Aboriginal Legal Issues”].
6
Allison Christians, “Introduction to Tax Policy and Theory” (2018) Social Science Research Network
at 15-16, online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186791>; See also EA Heaman, Tax,
Order and Good Governance: A New Political History of Canada, 1867-1917 (Montreal & Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2017) at 88-95 & 117. For example, in Canada’s early tax history it is clear that in places
such as British Columbia the electorate, mainly white settlers, attempted to establish a “white rule” and used the tax
system to accomplish their goals. This is succinctly summarized by Heaman in the following passage: “The state
chose fiscal policy as a privileged place to negotiate with public prejudices and translate them into finely calibrated,
legally rigorous criteria for citizenship. Taxation provided a crucial initial mediation between the cultural labels
attached to the categories “Chinese’ and “Indian” and the exercise of state coercive power.” See also, An Act to
Amend the Dominion Elections Act, 1938, SC 1950, c 35, s 1. The federal franchise allowing Indigenous peoples to
vote would not be extended to Indigenous peoples UNLESS they waived their tax exemption under the Indian
Act.
7
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, ss 91(3), 92 (2) [Constitution
Act].
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unlike the United States of America, Canada, with minor exceptions, does not recognize
Indigenous nations’ authority to tax non-Indigenous persons conducting business on Indigenous
lands. Limiting tax jurisdiction to federal and provincial governments means that Indigenous
governments have no inherent right to raise revenue, an essential element of self-government.8
While negotiated agreements are Canada’s preferred method of giving effect to Indigenous
peoples’ inherent right to self-government and determination,9 it is necessary to enact legislation
recognizing and protecting Indigenous governments’ tax bases until such agreements are
concluded.
The current fiscal arrangement provides little room for the development of Indigenous
fiscal autonomy. Instead of recognizing Indigenous nations’ inherent right to control economic
policy within their own jurisdiction, Canada has pursued a policy of assimilation by limiting
Indigenous nations’ ability to raise revenue through taxation and by allowing federal and
provincial governments to tax value derived from Indigenous lands and resources, undermining
Indigenous nations’ tax base and wealth.10
This thesis focuses on the legal rules governing Indigenous nations’ tax relations with
Canada. Most of these rules can be found in the Indian Act and Income Tax Act.11 The Indian Act

8

Borrows, “Aboriginal Legal Issues”, supra note 5 at 950; See also, Washington v Confederated Tribes of Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 US 134, 100 SCt 2069, 65 Led 2d (1980) (Colville) [Washington]. The United States
Supreme Court recognizes that Indigenous government power to tax is necessary to self-government and territorial
management.
9
Self-government Policy, supra note 2.
10
While section 87 of the Indian Act prevents the federal and provincial government from taxing Indigenous
interests on reserve, the protection does not extend to interests held by corporate entities. See Indian Act, RSC 1985,
c I-5, s 87.
87 (1) Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament or any Act of the legislature of a province, but subject
to section 83 and section 5 of the First Nations Fiscal Management Act, the following property is
exempt from taxation:
(a) the interest of an Indian or a band in reserve lands or surrendered lands; and
(b) the personal property of an Indian or a band situated on a reserve.
11
Certain provisions within Income Tax Act have been interpreted to provide Indigenous nations with broad tax
exemptions in order to facilitate self-government. Paragraph 149(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act exempts public bodies
from liability for Part I income tax. It has been the Canada Revenue Agency’s policy since 2016 to consider Indigenous

3

contains provisions exempting Indigenous persons and bands from taxation and provisions
permitting Indigenous bands to impose tax in very limited circumstances. For example, the
Indian Act provides First Nations peoples and bands with tax exemptions for the personal
property situated on reserve.12 The purpose of the exemption reflects Canada’s paternalistic
attitude towards Indigenous peoples. The exemption is designed to protect property allocated to
Indigenous peoples by the federal government. It is not designed to facilitate self-government or
economic development.13 Furthermore, the exemption is limited in two important ways. It only
applies to “Indians” as defined by the Indian Act and it only applies to personal property situated
on reserve.14 In this thesis I argue for enacting laws exempting members of Indigenous nations
from federal and provincial taxation without qualifications and laws recognizing Indigenous
nations’ right to tax corporations deriving value from Indigenous lands and resources.
Provisions within the Indian Act permitting Indigenous government to impose property
tax is a recent development that is reflective of Canada’s effort to provide Indigenous nations
with greater fiscal autonomy. A series of amendments to the Indian Act known as the Kamloops
Amendments allowed Indigenous nations to impose real property tax on non-Indigenous
businesses on reserve.15 The purpose of the Kamloops amendments is to facilitate Indigenous
nations’ ability to self-govern.16 This thesis argues that Indigenous taxation jurisdiction must go

bands public bodies. See Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 18(1)(b); See also, Canada Revenue Agency,
Interpretation Bulletin, IT-064503117, “Indian Act Bands” (July 27, 2016).
12
Ibid.
13
Williams v Canada, [1992] 1 SCR 877 at 885, 90 DLR (4th) 129 [Williams 1]. The Supreme Court states that the
purpose of section 87 was to “preserve the entitlements of Indians to their reserve lands and to ensure that the use of
their property on their reserve lands was not eroded by the ability of government to tax. …”; See also, Union of New
Brunswick Indians v New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [1998] 1 SCR 1161 at para 8, 161 DLR (4th) 193.
14
Indian Act, supra note 10 s 2.
15
See Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation v Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation, 2019 FC 813 at para
10. See also, Bill C-115, An Act to Amend the Indian Act (Designated Lands), SC 1988, amending the Indian Act,
RS, c I-6, as amended.
16
Canadian Pacific Ltd v Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 SCR 3 at para 18, 122 DLR (4th) 129 [Canadian Pacific].

4

beyond municipal style property taxation powers for meaningful self-determination. This can be
facilitated by enacting laws recognizing Indigenous nations’ inherent right to their tax base.
In arguing for recognizing and giving effect to Indigenous nations’ inherent right to
control tax policy on Indigenous territories, I rely on the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples,17 section 35 Aboriginal Rights and policy arguments furthering the
government’s goal of reconciliation.
Chapter 2 highlights the limitations of section 35 Aboriginal rights jurisprudence in the
promotion of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. The assertion of Crown
sovereignty over Indigenous peoples created conflicts in the areas of governance, rights to
resources and land. To minimize conflict and reconcile the prior existence of Indigenous peoples
with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, Canada enacted section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada has defined “Aboriginal rights” too narrowly
and, as a result, the evolution of section 35 jurisprudence has followed a path which fails to
consider and rectify the historic wrongs committed by the Crown towards Indigenous peoples.
Therefore, Section 35 has been inadequate in promoting Indigenous peoples right to selfdetermination and self-government.
In Chapter 3, I argue that Canada’s obligations as a signatory under the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People require it to take positive actions to implement
the UNDRIP. Article 3 recognizes Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, which
includes their right to freely pursue their economic development.18 Article 4 recognizes the need
for mechanisms by which Indigenous governments finance their autonomous function.19 In

17

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess. Annex,
UN Doc A/Res/61/295 (2007) (“United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)”).
18
Ibid, art 3.
19
Ibid, art 4.
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order to respect Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to self-determination, it is necessary to
provide Indigenous peoples with the ability to achieve fiscal autonomy so that they can pursue
their economic and social development free from federal and provincial interference. Granting
Indigenous nations tax jurisdiction over their own citizens and over businesses deriving value
from Indigenous lands can help in the promotion of Indigenous fiscal autonomy and the
implementation of UNDRIP.
Chapter 4 looks at Canada’s fiscal constitution, defined by the OECD as “the body of
fundamental laws and regulations that frames decision-making in the area of fiscal policy,”20
identifying its insufficiencies and making recommendations for aligning it with UNDRIP and the
Canadian government’s promise to recognize Indigenous peoples right to self-determination.
This thesis argues for an arrangement that (1) creates the conditions necessary for Indigenous
autonomy within Canada’s federal structure;21 and (2) recognizes the unique relations Indigenous
nations have with the Canadian government. Part 1 of Chapter 4 provides a brief overview of
where Indigenous nations fit within Canada’s fiscal landscape. It explores the fiscal
arrangements present within Canada with a focus on federal and provincial money raising and
spending powers and explores fiscal federalism as it governs federal-provincial social and
economic policies. Part 1 concludes by arguing that the current fiscal structure fails to promote
or respect Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and government. Part 2 canvasses the
special relationship Canada has to Indigenous peoples. Canada’s relationship to Indigenous
peoples requires it to not only alter its approach to funding Indigenous services but also take

20

Hansjörg Blöchliger and Junghun Kim, Fiscal Federalism 2016: Making Decentralisation Work (Paris:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016), at 32.
21
This approach is in line with Canada’s promise to implement self-government. Canada’s approach to the
implementation of Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to self-government does not include a right of sovereignty.
The government’s approach or goal is to include Indigenous government within the Canadian confederation. See
Self-government policy, supra note 2.
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steps recognizing Indigenous sovereignty over fiscal matters falling within Indigenous
jurisdiction, which includes taxation rights.
In section 1.2, I offer a brief overview of the circumstances giving rise to Canada’s
unique relations with Indigenous peoples, which serves as the foundation for the arguments to
come. I do so by exploring some of the events resulting in Indigenous financial dependence and
the laws and regulation used to control Indigenous finances. This will provide the reader with the
context necessary to understand the problems with Canadian laws controlling access to
Indigenous taxation rights. By understanding how Canada’s tax laws are an extension of colonial
policies of control and assimilation, the reader will better understand the importance of
legislation recognizing Indigenous peoples inherent right to fiscal autonomy free from state
interference and control.

1.2-Background
1.2.1-Canada’s Assault on Indigenous Fiscal Autonomy
The purpose of enacting laws recognizing and giving effect to Indigenous nations’ tax
rights is to promote Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. Self-determination cannot be
achieved without effective self-government and effective self-government cannot be achieved
without fiscal autonomy.22 This is most clearly elucidated by the words of Chief Clarence T.
Jules of the Kamloops First Nation: “We want control of our destiny and a peaceful co-existence
with Canadian society. For this to happen, First Nations must have an equitable share of lands,
resources and jurisdiction, and fiscal capability to fulfill their responsibilities as self-determining
peoples.”23

22

See Report of the Royal Commission, supra note 3. Chief Jules position is evident in the report of the royal
commission on aboriginal peoples. Chief Jules’ position is that effective self-government cannot be achieved
without fiscal autonomy. See also, Borrows, “Aboriginal Legal Issues”, supra note 5 at 1011.
23
See Report of the Royal Commission, supra note 3 at 290-93.
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This section describes the process by which colonial governments created a relationship
of dependence with Indigenous peoples: a relationship that has been used to steal Indigenous
resources and pursue policies of cultural genocide. This is accomplished by (1) highlighting the
interconnection between land, Indigenous culture, and fiscal autonomy; (2) summarizing the
process by which the British and Canadian governments acquired Indigenous lands and
resources, with the ultimate result of diminishing Indigenous fiscal autonomy and cultural
identity; and (3) the bureaucratic mechanisms the British and Canadian governments used and
continue to use to assimilate Indigenous peoples into Canadian society.
The theft of Indigenous lands and the forceful assimilation of Indigenous peoples into
Canadian society was facilitated by the interconnection between the loss of lands, the loss of
fiscal autonomy and cultural genocide. This thesis argues that the loss of lands resulted in a loss
of fiscal autonomy which created the conditions allowing the federal government to pursue
policies of cultural genocide. It will be argued that the destruction of Indigenous cultures
exacerbated the loss of lands and fiscal autonomy. By regaining fiscal autonomy, Indigenous
nations can rebuild and develop their economic, political, and social institutions free from federal
and provincial interference.24

1.2.2-Interconnections Between Land, Fiscal Autonomy & Indigenous
Cultural Identity
The unique relationship between Indigenous peoples and their lands required colonial
governments to engage in a series of economic, political and social actions targeted at destroying
Indigenous cultures.25 Unlike European societies, Indigenous societies believe in the

24

Ibid. A government dependent upon others cannot freely pursue its own economic and political objectives.
Neu, supra note 4 at 15. See also, Wendy Moss & Elain Gardner-O’Toole, Law and Government Division
November 1987, Aboriginal Peoples: History of Discriminatory Laws, online: < http://publications.gc.ca/CollectionR/LoPBdP/BP/bp175-e.htm#2.%20Restricted%20Right%20to%20Sell%20Agricultural%20Products(txt)>.
25

8

interconnectedness of all things.26 The interconnections inherent in Indigenous worldviews are
best explained by Chief John Snow, a member of the Stoney Indian Reserve in Alberta, who
explains that members of the Stoney Indian Reserve do not lead a fragmented,
compartmentalized life. For example, the social structure governing members of the Stoney
Indian Reserve ensures that economic, political, religious, and environmental concerns are all
interconnected and observed with every activity.27 Furthermore, land and nature hold a special
place in Indigenous societies. The centrality of land in Indigenous societies is elucidated through
the following statement made by Shawnee leader Tecumseh: “No tribe has the right to sell, even
to each other, much less to strangers. … Sell a country! Why not sell the great sea, as well as the
earth? Did not the Great Spirit make them all for the use of his children.”28 Since land is an
integral part of Indigenous peoples’ culture, colonial governments have pursued policies of
cultural genocide to facilitate the acquisition of Indigenous lands.29
In aggressively pursuing policies of cultural genocide, colonial governments used a
variety of tools and methods to destroy Indigenous cultures.30 However, the most important

26

For example, the social and political importance of the connection between humans and nature is reflected in
principles of Anishinabek law which regards some places on earth as sentient. In other words, earth has a legal
personality that must be consulted and respected when making decision on how to use the land. See Basil Johnston,
Ojibway Heritage, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976) at 24-25.
27
Chief John Snow, These Mountains Are Our Sacred Places: The Story of the Stoney Indians (Toronto: Samuel
Stevens, 1977) at 2-3, 12-13. See also, Manitoba, The Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission, The Justice
System and Aboriginal People: Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, vol 1 (Winnipeg: Queen’s
Printer, 1991) ch 5 at 115-116 [Manitoba Report]. Land is inseparable from Indigenous cultures and identity.
28
Borrows, “Aboriginal Legal Issues”, supra note 5 at 183. See also, FW Turner III, ed, The Portable North
America Indian Reader (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1977) at 246.
29
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Canada’s Residential Schools: The Final Report
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, vol 1 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2015); See also, Neu, supra note 4 at 15. In this thesis the term “cultural genocide” is used to refer to
economic, political and bureaucratic mechanisms that have been used to erase Indigenous cultures; See also, John
Paul Tasker, “Residential School findings point to ‘cultural genocide,’ commission chair says’ CBC (29 May 2015),
online: < https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/residential-schools-findings-point-to-cultural-genocide-commissionchair-says-1.3093580>.
30
Some of the methods used by colonial governments include placing bounties on Indigenous scalps, suppression of
cultural practices, containment of populations, residential school systems, and creation of the reserve system. See
Jon Tattrie, “Edward Cornwallis” (January 13, 2008) in The Canadian Encyclopedia, online: <
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/edward-cornwallis>; See also, René R Gadacz, “Potlash” in The
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element was the destruction of Indigenous fiscal autonomy/livelihoods.31 For example, through
laws and regulations Canada criminalized traditional Indigenous economic activities such as
trading in tobacco.32 The use of laws and regulations to undermine Indigenous fiscal autonomy
facilitated and accelerated the theft of Indigenous lands. The loss of Indigenous lands and
Indigenous dependence allowed colonial governments to pursue policies of cultural genocide.33
From an economic perspective, the importance of land cannot be overstated as the loss of lands
and rights associated with land ownership have resulted in the loss of fiscal autonomy and the
creation a relationship of dependence between Indigenous peoples and the Crown.34 For
example, the loss of land often entailed a loss of traditional rights associated with the lands such
as fishing, hunting, trapping, etc.35 This resulted in extreme economic hardship for Indigenous
Canadian Encyclopedia (7 February 2006), online: < https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/potlatch>;
See also JR Miller, “Residential Schools in Canada” in The Canadian Encyclopedia (10 October 2012), online: <
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/residential-schools>; See also Harvey A McCue, “Reserves” in
The Canadian Encyclopedia (31 May 2011), online: <
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-reserves>.
31
Neu, supra note 4 at 32. Colonial governments have done everything in their power in order to destroy Indigenous
economies and render Indigenous nations dependent upon the Crown. For example, in addition to the theft of land,
colonial governments have criminalized Indigenous trade in certain goods such as tobacco. See also Yellow Head
Institute, Cash Back (2021), online: <https://cashback.yellowheadinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/CashBack-A-Yellowhead-Institute-Red-Paper.pdf> [Yellowhead].
32
As recent as 2014 Canada was still promoting legislation hindering Indigenous economic activities. See e.g. Bill
C-10, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014, (assented to 6 November 2014), SC 2014, c
23. Bill C-10 introduced harsher penalties for trafficking in contraband tobacco.
33
Yellowhead, supra note 31 at 29. For example, The North-West Mounted Police (a para-military force established
in 1873 to maintain order), sought to control Indigenous nations in the prairies by depriving Indigenous nations from
access to bison. The Crown criminalized the trade in alcohol, which used bison hide. These efforts lead many
Indigenous nations to the brink of starvation, forcing them to negotiate with colonial governments for the surrender
of lands and/or rights associated with land.
34
Indigenous peoples living on reserves remain among the poorest groups within Canadian society. The median
income of Indigenous persons living on reserve is less than half that of non-indigenous populations. This is a result
of long-standing Crown conduct which has undermined Indigenous people’s traditional ways of life and livelihoods.
See Canada, Indigenous Services Canada: Annual Report to Parliament 2020, online: < https://www.sacisc.gc.ca/eng/1602010609492/1602010631711#chp3> [ISC Annual Report 2020]. Indigenous peoples are now
dependent upon the of the federal government to have the most basic of services on reserve lands. See, Constitution
Act, supra note 7 s 91(24). There is a significant lack of accountability in areas where the federal government
exercises its responsibility over Indigenous peoples. See Flood, supra note 1 ch 3 at 93.
35
See e.g. R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456, 177 DLR (4th) 513 [Marshall]. This is one of many cases involving a
situation where government regulations have interfered with Indigenous peoples’ ability to engage in traditional
activities for moderate livelihoods. The implementation of government regulations interfering with Indigenous
peoples’ ability to sustain themselves has been a constant issue in Indigenous Crown relations. Other examples
include logging and hunting regulations. See e.g. Forests Act, RSNS, c 179. While conservation or resource
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peoples that has been exploited by the Crown to assimilate Indigenous peoples into mainstream
Canadian society.36
The destruction of Indigenous fiscal autonomy created a relationship of dependence
through federal funding mechanisms allowing the federal government to remodel Indigenous
societies. For example, in order to pursue its colonial objectives in what is now known as
Canada, colonial governments provided Indigenous nations with annuity payments. These
payments came in the form of presents, as opposed to money. This was a deliberate design
mechanism allowing colonial governments to incentivize “civilized” behaviour.37 This is most
clearly elucidated by changes in annuity payments leading up to confederation where it was
necessary to change the hunter and gatherer lifestyles of Indigenous peoples in order to acquire
their lands. In remodelling Indigenous society, colonial governments shifted from supplying
items such as clothing, hunting supplies and blankets, to building supplies and agricultural
tools.38 More recently, Canada maintains its ability to remodel Indigenous societies through
unilateral funding agreements.39

1.2.2A-Loss of Lands and Economic Dependence40
The loss of Indigenous lands and resources is a result of concrete efforts of the Crown to
dispossess Indigenous peoples of land and to a much lesser extent misunderstandings between

management statutes are well intentioned, they have the effect of undermining Indigenous livelihoods. There are
now limited exceptions where aboriginal rights are concerned. However, this is a very recent development that
accompanied the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal rights. See Constitution Act, supra note 7 s 35.
36
Neu, supra note 4 at 87.
37
Neu, supra note 4 at 19.
38
Neu, supra note 4 at 62. These changes have been described by colonial administrators of Great Britain as “active
steps to civilize and educate the Indians…”
39
See e.g. Russell A Evans, “Budgeting Practices in Canadian First Nations Settings: A Study of the Persistence of
Arbitrary-set Social Hierarchies”, online: <https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/tedrogersschool/cpaosymposium/Budgeting-Practices-in-Canadian-First-Nations-Settings-Evans.pdf>.
40
See Yellowhead, supra note 31 at 34-46.
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Indigenous peoples and the Crown.41 The loss of lands can be broken down into two periods: (1)
pre-confederation and (2) post-confederation. Pre-confederation, Britain engaged in two forms of
bargaining with Indigenous peoples: (a) the purchase of land; and (b) the exchange of goods for
military support.42 These were necessary transactions for the success of Britain’s colonial
ambitions which necessitated Indigenous military support against other imperialist nations
including France and subsequently the United States.43 While misunderstandings were present in
land transactions,44 the defeat of France removed pressures incentivizing Britain to honour
promises made to Indigenous nations.45
A prime example of how Britain’s consolidation of power in North America facilitated its
broken promises and theft of land can be found in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.46 The Royal
Proclamation of 1763 was declared shortly after the defeat of France in North America.47 Its
purpose was to outline jurisdictional boundaries between Indigenous nations and the Crown. One
of its central tenets is a promise to protect Indigenous peoples from fraud in the purchase of their
lands. This was to be accomplished by requiring third parties wishing to purchase Indigenous
lands to do so through the Crown. In other words, the Crown had a monopoly over purchasing
Indigenous lands.48
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Ironically, instead of serving to protect Indigenous land interests, the Royal Proclamation
of 1763 coupled with Indigenous peoples’ fiscal dependence and dire economic conditions
facilitated the theft of Indigenous lands. The Royal Proclamation of 1763’s effect was to create a
monopsony over the purchase of lands. By preventing the general population from purchasing
Indigenous lands, colonial governments were able to dissociate the value of Indigenous lands
from the influence of the free market. This fact coupled with Indigenous peoples’ dire economic
conditions created through unjust colonial policies allowed colonial governments to not only
manipulate the value of land but also structure the transaction so that capital payments were not
required.49
Post-confederation, the federal and provincial governments acquired title to all
Indigenous territories in what is now known as Canada.50 A variety of methods were used to
legitimize colonial governments’ assertion of sovereignty.51 For example, the de facto assertion
of sovereignty over Indigenous territories in British Columbia was legitimized through the
Proclamation Relating to the Acquisition of Land, 1859, which asserted Crown title to all land in
British Columbia.52 Similar to the British Colonial policy, the government of British Columbia
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John Leonard Taylor, Treaties and Historical Research Centre Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 1985, Treaty
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adopted a policy of pre-emption that prohibited the acquisition of Indigenous lands.53
Unfortunately, the officials responsible for implementing the pre-emption system usually failed
in taking the steps necessary to identify the sites of Indigenous peoples, to mark them out as
reserved and to question the pre-emptions that had taken place when it became apparent that they
were claiming Indigenous lands.54

1.2.3-Weaponized Bureaucracy
Having described the manner in which Indigenous peoples were stripped of their lands
and resources, this section summarizes the bureaucratic mechanisms governments have used to
ensure that funding can be used as a tool of institutional assimilation.55 Without understanding
bureaucracy’s role in institutional assimilation, it is difficult to criticize policies that may on the
surface appear to give Indigenous nations self-government rights but in reality are simply a
continuation of the federal government’s goal of assimilating Indigenous peoples. For example,
municipal style government, money-bylaws and taxation policies are all forms of coercive
tutelage.56
The delegation of authority in municipal style governance structures, restrictive money
bylaws and paternalistic taxation policies are part of the governments’ arsenal of bureaucratic
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mechanisms used to separate moral questions from questions of administrative efficiency.57 In
other words, the dangers of bureaucracy lie in the fact that government genocidal policies may be
hidden in administrative practices with a rational goal.58 For example, the tight control over
reserve membership, movement of individuals, annuity payments and legislative interferences
with money matters, including taxation rights, were all passed under the guise of cost-cutting and
efficiency rationales.59
The government’s instrument of choice in drowning Indigenous cultures and institutions
in a web of bureaucracy is the Indian Act (1876).60 In combination with Indigenous peoples’
economic dependence, the delegation of authority through the Indian Act created an asymmetric
power structure enabling the federal government to move forward with its assimilation project
under the guise of Indigenous self-governance.61 The Indian Act allowed for the administration
of Indigenous peoples through a federal bureaucracy.62 This project dates as far back as 1869,
with the Gradual Enfranchisement Act, where the federal government began to introduce
legislation replacing Indigenous forms of government with municipal style governments.63 The
general rule was that Indigenous governments only exist within a hierarchical structure where
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their decisions were subject to the approval of federal government officials.64 This resulted in the
development of initiatives that on the surface seemed to extend Indigenous autonomy but in
reality merely entrenched the status quo.65
The fiscal problems inherent in the hierarchical federal-Indigenous relations are most
salient in self-government initiatives and can mainly be addressed by promoting Indigenous
fiscal autonomy. Due to the dependency of Indigenous nations on federal funding, legislation
enabling self-government is often accompanied by paternalistic funding arrangements.66 For
example, since First Nation Band Council structures under the Indian Act are subordinate
municipal style governments, the level of funding and the restrictions imposed upon its delivery
remain subject to the fiscal priorities of the federal government.67 Federal funding arrangements
are often guided by considerations such as budget management and availability of federal
resources.68 Promoting Indigenous fiscal autonomy by recognizes Indigenous nations’ inherent
right to controlling taxation laws within their jurisdiction is an important step in unwinding the
hierarchical federal-Indigenous relations.
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1.3-Reconciliation or Gentle Assimilation through Fiscal Control?
The development of the welfare state in Canada accompanied by heightened public
awareness of the poor socioeconomic conditions on reserves forced the federal government to
focus on increasing Indigenous nations’ decision-making powers in service delivery on
reserves.69 By the early 1970s, Indigenous nations were administering their own government
programs through funding arrangements with the goal of increasing Indigenous independence.70
By the 1990s, the Department of Indian and Northern Development was a funding agency with
Indigenous nations responsible for program delivery.71 However, these agreements were all
concluded within a hierarchical structure where Indigenous governments are subject to the
priorities of the federal government.72
While the increased participation of Indigenous nations in service delivery is a welcome
development, the funding relationships remain highly problematic. Despite the development of
numerous funding approaches73 to promote Indigenous self-governance,74 problems persist.
Regardless of the type of funding arrangement and degree of control it gives Indigenous nations,
current funding arrangements do not grant Indigenous nations independence over those funds.75
For example, the “grant approach”,76 may appear to provide Indigenous nations with fiscal
autonomy. However, the requirements for qualifying for grants necessitate that Indigenous
nations conform to westernized systems of accountability.77 Furthermore, the government’s
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funding agreements maintain the relationship of dependence that has been characteristic of
Crown-Indigenous relations. For example, Indigenous Services Canada’s (“ISC”) “model
comprehensive agreement” grants the federal government the right to adjust or cancel any
funding with one year notice. It also imposes and maintains the historic paternalistic relationship
with Indigenous nations through onerous reporting requirements.78
The issue with the current funding arrangements maintaining the federal government’s
paternalistic role in relation to Indigenous nations is that it undermines their rights to selfdetermination and self-government.79 It is doubtful that a government dependent upon the fiscal
priorities and political ideologies of another government will ever be capable of selfdetermination.80 A potential solution that this thesis proposes is to grant Indigenous nations tax
jurisdiction over their own people and resources. This will enable them to better develop their
own economies and, more importantly, to ultimately break free of the relationship of dependence
characteristic of Crown-Indigenous relations.81
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1.4-Research Methodology:
As with most legal research, this thesis relies on the doctrinal method. The arguments are
supported by careful identification, analysis, and evaluation of the laws (common laws, statutory
laws, constitutional laws, and international law) and regulations pertaining to Indigenous
nations’ tax jurisdiction. In doing so, I pay careful attention to the underlying theories, economic
realities and historical events giving rise to the doctrine we now call law. Failure to do so would
remove important context, which would lead to the erasure of some of the harmful judgements
and assumptions laying behind the logic that has been used to assimilate Indigenous peoples into
Canadian society. This thesis argues for providing Indigenous nations with greater fiscal
autonomy by identifying insufficiencies in Canadian law and policy. Canadian laws and policies
have proven inadequate in promoting Indigenous fiscal autonomy and self-determination.
Indigenous fiscal autonomy and self-determination are critical for achieving reconciliation. As a
result, this thesis argues for using UNDRIP as the legal framework for restructuring economic
relations between Canada and Indigenous nations. As a remedial human rights instrument
endorsed by the Truth and Reconciliation commission and recognized through Bill C-15,
UNDRIP will be used to assess the sufficiency of current laws in promoting and respecting
Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.
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Chapter 2 - Section 35 Aboriginal Rights & Self-determination
Canada’s colonial policies towards Indigenous nations have created numerous issues that
stand in the way of Indigenous nations and their ability to achieve self-determination. Canada’s
unilateral assertion of sovereignty over Indigenous peoples and lands created conflicts in the
areas of governance, general rights to resources, and to land.82 For example, Canada’s unilateral
assertion of sovereignty has limited Indigenous peoples’ ability to live their lives under their own
laws and traditions and to develop their economies in a manner consistent with their cultures and
beliefs.83 In an effort to reconcile the existence of Indigenous societies with Canadian
sovereignty, Canada recognized and protected Aboriginal rights through section 35 of the
Constitution Act.84
Despite the benefits arising from constitutionally protecting Aboriginal rights through
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 198285, section 35 has failed to give effect to Indigenous
nations’ right to self-determination. The Canadian Constitution controls law-making authority
within the Canadian state.86 In other words, it controls what the Crown can and cannot do in
relation to Indigenous nations.87 Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 prevents the Crown
from passing laws or regulations that violate an Aboriginal right or treaty.88 Unfortunately, in
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amending the Constitution to recognize and protect Aboriginal rights, the Canadian government
failed to define what Aboriginal rights entail.89 This failure to define Aboriginal rights has been
referred to as the “empty box” approach.90
The difficulties associated with amending the Canadian Constitution and the political
beliefs of the various provinces gave rise to the empty box approach.91 The empty box approach
is limited to protecting existing Aboriginal and treaty rights, which are defined by the courts on a
case-by-case basis.92 As a result, the empty box approach fails to recognize or protect Indigenous
peoples right to autonomy or self-determination.93 Failing to explicitly recognize Indigenous
peoples’ right to autonomy or self-determination creates insurmountable difficulties in resolving
issues related to governance, resources, and land.94 In other words, the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of section 35 is premised on the unquestioned sovereignty of the Crown over
Indigenous peoples and lands.95 And as a result, attempts to achieve self-determination through
section 35 litigation has in most cases failed.96
In the area of self-government and economic development, section 35 jurisprudence has
failed in furthering Indigenous peoples’ ability to achieve self-determination. By failing to define
Aboriginal rights, section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 has proven to be an inadequate tool in
furthering Indigenous nations’ right to self-determination. For example, in R v Pamajewon
members of the Shawanaga First Nation or Eagle Lake Band were convicted of keeping a
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common gaming house on reserve contrary to section 201 of the Criminal Code.97 In appealing
to the Supreme Court the appellants argued that high stakes gambling was an Aboriginal right
protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.98 In rejecting the appellants’ claim, the
Supreme Court refused to accept the appellants’ definition of the claim as a right to manage the
use of their reserve lands. The Court stated that “to so characterize the appellants’ claim would
be to cast the Court’s inquiry at a level of excessive generality. Aboriginal rights, including any
asserted right to self-government, must be looked at in light of the specific circumstances of each
case and, in particular, in light of the specific history and culture of the aboriginal group.”99
In limiting Aboriginal rights to those integral to the history and culture of the Aboriginal
group claiming a specific right, the Supreme Court confirmed the test laid out in R v Van der
peet.100 In order for an Aboriginal right to fall within the scope of section 35 protections it must
be a part of a practice, custom and tradition integral to the Aboriginal society that existed prior to
contact with Europeans.101 This test is in line with the purpose of enacting section 35 which was
to reconcile the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with Crown sovereignty.102
The purpose of section 35 and the test developed for recognizing and protecting
Aboriginal rights is fundamentally at odds with Aboriginal autonomy and right to selfdetermination. First, the purpose of section 35 as defined by the Supreme Court is incompatible
with Indigenous peoples understanding of sovereignty. Section 35 is premised on the Crown
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sovereignty over Indigenous peoples.103 Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, believe that
sovereignty cannot be surrendered or taken away.104 Second, the test laid down for determining
whether an “Aboriginal right” exists is narrow and fails to consider and rectify the historic
wrongs committed by the Crown towards Indigenous peoples.105 As a result, the judiciary has
emphasized the need for the negotiated settlement of aboriginal rights.106 Negotiated settlements
of Aboriginal rights have come in the form of modern treaties.

2.1-Modern Treaties and Tax Jurisdiction
Modern treaties recognizing and transferring tax jurisdiction to Indigenous nations are a
recent development spurred by the development of the doctrine of Aboriginal title and section 35
of the Constitution Act, 1982. Canada’s position regarding Aboriginal title107 to Indigenous
peoples’ traditional territories has historically been that it was non-existent unless preserved by
treaty or legislation.108 In 1973, the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder forced Canada to
reconsider Aboriginal title. In Calder, the Supreme Court held that Canada’s sovereignty was
subject to rights of occupancy of Indigenous peoples, thus, placing very minor limits on
Canada’s sovereignty.109 Limits on Canada’s sovereignty were later expanded with the
development of the concept of Aboriginal title. Aboriginal title confers upon Indigenous peoples
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the right to exclusive use and occupation of unceded territories.110 As a result of Calder, Canada
created its first ever land claims negotiation policy.111
The evolution of Aboriginal title jurisprudence gave rise to comprehensive land claim
agreements and eventually self-government agreements.112 Comprehensive land claims
agreements can be thought of as a compromise. They are an exchange of uncertain Aboriginal
rights in land and resources for a defined package of rights and benefits.113 Comprehensive land
claims agreements such as the Nisga’a Final Agreement often contain chapters transferring tax
jurisdiction from federal and/or provincial governments to Indigenous government.114 The
Nisga’a Final Agreement replaces the taxation provision within the Indian Act with a completely
new scheme created in collaboration with the Nisga’a nation.115 For example, the Nisga’a Final
Agreement grants the Nisga’a government the power to enact taxation laws affecting Nisga’a
citizens on Nisga’a lands, including property taxation.116 In exchange for taxation rights, Nisga’a
citizens would eventually lose their sales tax exemption in 8 years and their income tax
exemption in 12 years.117
Unfortunately, the Canadian government has failed in tailoring comprehensive land
claims and self-government agreements to the unique needs of Indigenous nations in Canada.118
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For example, negotiations between Canada, British Columbia and the Sechelt Indian Band failed
because the government of British Columbia insisted on composing a treaty where Sechelt
Indian Band members would lose their sales tax exemption after 8 years and income tax
exemptions after 12 years.119 Instead of tailoring agreements to the particular circumstances of
each Indigenous nation, British Columbia followed an approach where the terms of the Nisga’a
Final Agreement were treated as the only deal available to any other Indigenous nation.120
In the context of comprehensive land claims agreements, tax agreements need to be
tailored to the circumstances of each Indigenous nation. The use of the same formula in
calculating the phasing of the Indian Act tax exemption in exchange for clearly defined rights is
arbitrary. In rejecting the government’s proposal under the Sechelt Agreement-in-Principle, the
Sechelt Indian Band objected due to the arbitrariness and inequity that would result from
accepting the Nisga’a deal as the only possible deal available to Indigenous nations.121 For at
least 20 years, the Sechelt Indian Band argued that if the purpose of maintaining section 87 tax
exemption was in part related to the promotion of Indigenous economic development, then it
would make sense to extend it to all Indigenous peoples without exception. And that the
exemption should be maintained for a realistic transition period with clearly defined goals. For
example, if a large socioeconomic gap exists between a particular Indigenous nation and the rest
of Canadian society, then the exemption should be maintained for however long is necessary to
close the gap.122
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The test developed by Supreme Court for defining and protecting Aboriginal rights is
incapable of requiring the Crown to enter into tax agreements or respect tax agreements that are
equitable and fair to Indigenous nations. For example, in April 2021 the New Brunswick
government decided to abruptly scrap a tax-sharing agreement with Indigenous nations.123 In
supporting the decision to scrap the agreements, Premier Higgs described the agreements as
“unsustainable and unfair”.124 This comment was made even though Indigenous nations are
using the revenues from tax agreements to supplement inadequate fiscal transfers for health,
education and social programs.125 The Higgs government maintains that the tax agreements are
independent commercial agreements not protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982.126
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Chapter 3 - The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples and Indigenous Fiscal Autonomy
The Declaration does not represent solely the viewpoint of the United Nations,
nor does it represent solely the viewpoint of the Indigenous Peoples. It is a
Declaration which combines our views and interests, and which sets the
framework for the future. It is a tool for peace and justice, based upon mutual
recognition and respect.127

3.1 Introduction
This chapter highlights the importance of aligning Canadian laws and policies with the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Canada has
endorsed UNDRIP at the international level and recently passed implementing legislation at the
domestic level.128 Therefore, Canada is legally bound to give effect to Indigenous peoples right
to self-determination and self-government.129 Self-determination entails the ability to
independently finance self-government in order to develop Indigenous economic, political and
social systems and institutions of governance.130 This chapter contains three distinct, but
interconnected, analytical sections. First, it traces the origins and development of UNDRIP as a
remedial human rights instrument requiring Canada to modify or enact legislation promoting
Indigenous fiscal autonomy and Indigenous self-determination. Second, it highlights the
importance of Indigenous fiscal autonomy in achieving reconciliation and facilitating the
implementation of UNDRIP. Third, it provides an overview of Canadian laws governing
Indigenous taxation rights and exemptions, concluding that they fail to promote Indigenous fiscal
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autonomy and Indigenous self-determination. The meaningful recognition of Indigenous peoples
right to self-determination requires Canada to acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to
control economic policy through taxation within their jurisdiction. This can be achieved by
enacting new legislation and tax agreements that are developed in conformity with the principles
contained within UNDRIP.

3.2-Origins and Development
UNDRIP is a remedial human rights instrument.131 In the most general sense,
declarations are not legally binding. However, this does not mean that they have no legal effect.
Declarations have often been described as “solemn commitments” where maximum compliance
is expected by member states.132 Similar to other human rights instruments, declarations are
meant to protect minority groups (i.e., Indigenous peoples) by setting the minimum standards
necessary for their “survival, dignity and well-being.”133 By setting minimum standards,
declarations play an important role in narrowing the gap between human rights and the laws in
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place to protect the human rights of an oppressed group within society.134 This is done by setting
standards that will one day be transformed into binding treaties.135 For example, the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights was adopted in 1948 as non-binding declaration but has
subsequently developed into the standard by which member states conduct their affairs.136
The purpose of UNDRIP is to slow down and eventually reverse the destructive effects
colonialism has had on Indigenous cultural, political, legal and economic autonomy.137 Unlike
other United Nations declarations, UNDRIP is unique in that it is the only Declaration created in
collaboration with the right-holders themselves.138 It is therefore an opportunity for nations to
restructure their relationships with their Indigenous communities.139 In order for this opportunity
to be realized, the Declaration has had to (1) be adopted by the United Nations; and (2) be
implemented by member states.140 This Chapter argues that the adoption of UNDRIP by the
United Nations and its endorsement by Canada create a positive obligation upon the Canadian
government to implement legislation giving effect to Indigenous peoples’ right to selfdetermination. The following section traces the events leading to the Declaration’s adoption by
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the United Nations while canvassing some of the impediments standing in the way of effective
implementation in Canada.

3.2.1-Twenty-Three Years in the Making: The Long and Bumpy Road to
Adoption
UNDRIP is arguably the result of a number of catalysts most important of which are the
increased involvement of Indigenous peoples in the United Nations’ system of human rights and
increased public awareness to violations of Indigenous political, economic and human rights.141
The origins of UNDRIP can be traced to the 1970s where the international Indigenous peoples’
movement focussed on the United Nation’s system for the advancement of Indigenous rights.142
In 1971, Martinez Cobo published the results of his study, the Study of the Problem of
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, highlighting discrimination faced by Indigenous
populations.143 As a result, the United Nations established a working group on Indigenous
populations (WGIP).144 The working group was tasked with setting the minimum standards
needed for the protection of Indigenous peoples. Their work led to the first draft of UNDRIP,
which included 46 operative articles including the right to self-determination.145
The drafting of UNDRIP was a highly complex process owing to the disagreement that
existed regarding definitions of Indigenous rights, rights to self-determination, rights to lands and
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resources, etc.146 It was not until 2006 that a compromise draft was finalized and with few
exceptions was positively received.147 One of the exceptions was brought forward by Namibia,
acting on behalf of a number of African nations. Namibia tabled a proposal to postpone the
resolution for further consideration. A number of African nations expressed concerns regarding
the lack of definition of “Indigenous peoples” and a concern that the right to self-determination
would be interpreted by Indigenous peoples as conferring a unilateral right of self-determination
causing instability in nation states.148
On the 31st of August 2007 the Steering Committee responsible for seeing the UNDRIP
project to fruition circulated a report entitled UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples: Report of the Global Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus Steering Committee. The Report
consisted of 3 annexes: (1) a compromise agreement tabled by Mexico and Namibia on behalf of
the African nations (“the compromise agreement”); (2) the original proposal by the African
nations; and (3) a new and restrictive proposal from Canada, Colombia, New Zealand and the
Russian Federation with major changes to 13 articles.149 Namibia explained that if the
compromise agreement was accepted by Indigenous groups, the African nations would vote
down any proposed amendment by opposing states (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the
United states). Ultimately the compromise agreement was accepted by Indigenous groups.150
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By September 13, 2007, the Declaration was tabled at the UN General Assembly and
adopted following a vote.151 Opposing states including Canada would not allow for its adoption
without a vote.152 The Declaration was voted on with the final vote result being 144 in favour, 4
against (Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States), and 11 abstentions. As a
result, the Declaration was officially adopted by the UN General Assembly and, thus, became
part of international law.153 Canada elaborated on its concerns in the following statement:
Canada has significant concerns with respect to the wording of the current text,
including the provisions on lands, territories and resources; on free, prior and
informed consent when used as a veto; on self-government without recognition of
the importance of negotiations; on intellectual property; on military issues; and on
the need to achieve an appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of
indigenous peoples, Member States and third parties.154
Canada’s concern with UNDRIP mainly related to the level of generality it contains.155
UNDRIP is composed of twenty-four preambular paragraphs and forty-six operative vehicles.156
The preamble contains a recognition of the historic wrongs committed towards Indigenous
peoples with a promise of fostering cooperative relations with the goal of achieving
reconciliation.157 The forty-six operative vehicles cover aspects of Indigenous peoples lives but
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are grounded in Article 3 which recognizes Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.158
The right to self-determination includes the right to govern oneself independently, without
interference from other levels of government.159
Despite Canada’s concerns regarding the level of generality contained within UNDRIP,
by 2010-11 Canada’s attitude towards UNDRIP was beginning to change. In 2010 Canada
reversed its negative vote by expressing a qualified endorsement of UNDRIP.160 In other words,
Canada’s position towards UNDRIP did not substantively change. Canada viewed UNDRIP as
aspirational with no force or effect on Canadian law.161 It was not until 2016 that Canada
substantively changed its position on UNDRIP. On May 2016, Indigenous and Northern Affairs
Minister Carolyn Bennett, addressing the United Nations at the Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues, fully endorsed UNDRIP.162 Unlike the 2010 endorsement, the 2016 confirmation of
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endorsement was accompanied by stronger political will to align Canadian laws with
UNDRIP.163

3.2.2-Implementation in Canada
As a declaration, UNDRIP provides guidance on the legal criteria necessary for the
protection of Indigenous rights.164 Since its adoption by the UN General Assembly, important
issues concerning UNDRIP’s influence on Canadian law and Indigenous rights have been
raised.165 Some have argued that international instruments negotiated and concluded outside of
Canada must be subject to Canadian Parliamentary procedures before having any legal effect.166
This is a misconception that misconstrues the nature and effect of declarations.167
Canada has a moral and political obligation to meaningfully implement UNDRIP.168
Implementation is systematic in nature and requires not only judicial notice through the
application of customary international law and the principle of conformity but also policy reform
in the form of legislative initiatives aimed at promoting and respecting the principles contained
within UNDRIP.169 The alignment of judicial and legislative avenues towards the goal of
achieving reconciliation will hopefully result in meaningful implementation.
Unfortunately, since its adoption by the UN General Assembly, UNDRIP has faced
significant barriers to its implementation in Canada.170 Examples include (1) wide-spread
ignorance concerning the nature and effect of UNDRIP as an international instrument; (2) lack of
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political will; and (3) financial constraints.171 The following two sections explain that meaningful
implementation in the context of self-determination entail (1) the alignment of Canadian law
with international law; and (2) the development of legislation aimed at facilitating nation-tonation relationships.

3.2.3A-The application of International Law in Canada: Customary
International Law
The meaningful implementation of UNDRIP requires aligning Canadian law with
international law. However, this has been difficult to achieve due to general lack of awareness on
the nature and effect of international law among the Canadian legal community.172 For example,
in Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nations v National Automobile, Aerospace,
Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada, Sharpe J.A. refused to consider the draft
of UNDRIP. Sharpe J.A. held that the draft of UNDRIP does not provide any meaningful
assistance in resolving the issues of Canadian constitutional law raised.173 In doing so Sharpe
J.A. conflated declarations and conventions and mistakenly believed that a declaration requires
endorsement before having any legal effect.174
While a declaration cannot by itself create enforceable legal obligations, it does have legal
effect in Canada and should be used to influence the development of Canadian law.175 Part of the
confusion concerning the application of declarations in Canada may stem from Canada’s dualist
approach to international treaties. Without further action, international treaties do not impact
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domestic law or individual rights in Canada.176 However, declarations can have legal effect in
Canada through the application of customary international law and through the presumption of
conformity.177
A number of provisions within UNDRIP are now part of customary international law.178
Customary international law refers to state obligations arising from established international
practices.179 There are two requirements for UNDRIP articles to be considered part of customary
international law. First, the practice in relation to a particular article must be “sufficiently
general, widespread, representative and consistent.”180 Second, the practice must be “undertaken
with a sense of legal right or obligation”, as “distinguished from mere usage or habit”.181
In 2010, the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Committee of the International Law Association
concluded that the following articles are part of customary international law:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, that secures to indigenous
peoples have the right to decide [sic], within the territory of the State in which they live,
what their future will be; indigenous peoples have the right to autonomy or selfgovernment. Indigenous peoples have the right to recognition and preservation of their
cultural identity.182
As a result, Canada has an obligation to interpret existing laws in a manner that gives effect to
the principle of self-determination. Canadian Courts have embraced an adoptionist approach
towards customary international law. Absent clear conflicting laws, domestic law should be
interpreted in conformity with customary international law.183 This is most clearly stated by
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the Supreme Court in Nevsun Resources: “Understanding and embracing our role in
implementing and advancing customary international law allows Canadian courts to
meaningfully contribute, as we already assertively have, to the ‘choir’ of domestic court
judgments around the world shaping the ‘substance of international law’”184

3.2.3B-The application of International Law in Canada: Presumption of
Conformity
Courts have an important role to play in aligning Canadian law with international law.
Courts can align Canadian laws with international law through the presumption of conformity.
The presumption of conformity requires Canadian courts to interpret Canadian law in a manner
that is consistent with Canada’s international obligations.185 For example, in Ordon Estate,
Iacobacci and Major Js. held that “although international law is not binding upon Parliament or
the provincial legislatures, a court must presume that legislation is intended to comply with
Canada’s obligations under international instruments and as a member of the international
community.”186 Therefore, the presumption of conformity allows courts to use instruments such
as UNDRIP in interpreting Canadian laws.187
Historically the presumption of conformity was not used effectively in applying UNDRIP
by the Supreme Court.188 Mitchell v MNR involved a dispute concerning Indigenous exemptions
from customs duties imposed by Canada. In concluding that Indigenous peoples do not have a
right to an exemption from customs duties, the Supreme Court held that the draft version of
UNDRIP can be used in interpreting Aboriginal rights.189 Despite stating that the draft version of
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UNDRIP can be used to interpret Aboriginal rights, the Supreme Court did not use UNDRIP in
defining the scope of the asserted right.190

3.2.4-Implementation Through Legislative Initiatives and Reform
In order to respect Indigenous nations’ right to self-determination and government, the
principles embodied in UNDRIP need to be better understood and respected by the Canadian
legal and political communities.191 This requires that (1) the courts understand the nature of
UNDRIP and rights it contains and (2) Parliament implement legislation facilitating selfdetermination for Indigenous nations.192 The barriers standing in the way of the effective
implementation of UNDRIP can be attributed to widespread ignorance within the legal
community as to the nature and effect of UNDRIP.193 Failure to understand the nature and effect
of UNDRIP has stood in the way of legislative reform facilitating the implementation of
UNDRIP. This has been described as a “lack of political will.”194 The recently enacted Bill C-15
will play an important role in clarifying the nature and effect of UNDRIP and will play an
important role in facilitating the effective implementation of UNDRIP.195 The passage of Bill C15 will help create a much-needed legislative framework for effective implementation efforts.196
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One of the main provisions contained within UNDRIP pertains to Indigenous peoples
right to self-determination and governance.197 Without Indigenous fiscal autonomy, Indigenous
peoples right to self-determination cannot be achieved.198 It is therefore imperative that
Parliament enact legislation facilitating Indigenous fiscal autonomy. This includes (1) preventing
other levels of governments from diluting Indigenous nations’ resources through taxation; and
(2) allowing Indigenous nations to pass their own tax laws to facilitate governmental functions.
The recently enacted Bill C-15 will be extremely helpful in clarifying the effect UNDRIP has on
Canadian law and policy.199 Bill C-15 was not the first attempt at having UNDRIP recognize by
Parliament. The following section provides a brief overview on legislative initiatives undertaken
to have UNDRIP recognized by Parliament.

3.2.4A-Bill C-262-April 21, 2016
Bill C-262, An Act to ensure that the laws of Canada are in harmony with the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, introduced by the Honourable Romeo
Saganash in 2016 was the second attempt at the federal level to have Canada align its laws with
the minimum standards set by UNDRIP.200 While Bill C-262 was passed by the House of
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Commons, it died on the Senate floor due to the efforts of Conservative Senators and MPs who
delayed the vote in an effort to prevent Bill C-262 from becoming law.201
There are five aspects to Bill C-262 that will help develop a blueprint ensuring that
federal laws and policies are consistent with the minimum standards set by UNDRIP.202 First,
Bill C-262 will clarify that UNDRIP has legal effect in Canada. Second, it places a positive
obligation on government to ensure that laws are in alignment with the principles set out in
UNDRIP. Third, it requires the government to develop a national action plan to achieve the goals
of UNDRIP. Fourth, it creates an annual reporting requirement on the progress made as a result
of the national action plan. Fifth, the Bill highlights that the Act would not negatively affect any
rights recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.203
Bill C-262 never became law due to concerns of members of the Conservative Party of
Canada. First, Conservatives believed that recognizing UNDRIP through Bill C-262 was
unnecessary. For example, Mrs. Cathy McLeod suggested that any problems relating to
Indigenous rights in Canada were not the result of an inadequate legal framework, but a result of
Canada’s failure to live up to the honour of the Crown.204 Second, Conservatives voiced
concerns regarding the uncertainty the bill would introduce. For example, Mrs. McLeod
emphasized confusion that would result if politicians and members of the legal community
cannot precisely explain how “Free, prior, and informed consent” or rights to territories, land and
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resources are to be interpreted.205 As a result, conservative Senators and MPs through delay
tactics prevented Bill C-262 from proceeding to a vote and, as a result, died on the floor.206

3.2.4B-Bill C-15-December 3, 2020
As part of the Liberal government’s promise to introduce legislation facilitating the
implementation of UNDRIP, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada introduced
Bill C-15, An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, on December 3, 2020.207 Bill C-15 is similar in spirit to Bill C-262 with minor technical
changes.208 Similar to Bill C-262, Bill C-15 focuses on the implementation and development of
an action plan to achieve the goals of UNDRIP. It helps create a framework for ensuring that
federal laws are consistent with UNDRIP and for developing laws to aid in the implementation
of UNDRIP. Furthermore, it creates mechanisms to ensure accountability and provides for
dispute resolution mechanisms.209
One of the major themes in Bill C-15 concerns the development of an action plan for the
implementation of UNDRIP.210 Indigenous groups participating in the development of Bill C-15
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highlighted the need for legislation that addresses gaps in education, housing, food security,
healthcare, child welfare and measures protecting indigenous cultures.211 Funding is a major
concern in regards to the above goals.
The Conservative Party of Canada has raised similar concerns to those seen in its
opposition to UNDRIP at the international level and its opposition to Bill C-262.212 For example,
during the second reading of Bill C-15, Conservative MP Mr. Jamie Schmale raised concerns
regarding “the broadly worded provision and the implications of that working and the lack of
definition on a number of them.”213 More specifically, Conservative members of Parliament and
Conservative Senators are fixated on the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and
have equated it to a veto power.214 This is despite the fact that not even the UN views FPIC as a
veto power.215
The Conservative government’s refusal to allow Bills recognizing UNDRIP is not
grounded in any legal rationale.216 As explained, UNDRIP already applies in Canada through
principles of customary international law and through the presumption of conformity.
Implementing legislation would provide the education necessary for Parliamentarians and
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members of the judicial branch to enact and interpret laws in a manner consistent with the
minimum standards necessary to respect Indigenous peoples’ human rights.217
While not necessary in the legal sense, the passage of Bill C-15 will be highly beneficial
to implementing UNDRIP in Canada. The major obstacles standing in the way of meaningful
implementation are lack of political will and ignorance.218 The passage of Bill C-15 signals a
change in political will and will serve to educate the judiciary on their roles. This will speed up
the process of implementation through the development of legislation addressing major areas of
concern that may lay outside of the judiciary’s jurisdiction.219 For meaningful implementation,
parliamentarians must implement new legislation or amend existing legislation to recognize and
affirm Indigenous peoples right to self-determination and government.220

3.3-Reconciliation, Indigenous Fiscal Autonomy and UNDRIP
The theft of Indigenous lands and resources and the construction of systems of governance
designed to eliminate Indigenous social, political, and economic institutions has resulted in widespread harms suffered by Indigenous communities.221 Canada’s residential school system is a
prime example of the harms Canada was willing to inflict upon Indigenous nations in pursuing
its objectives. According to the Davin Report, the Indian residential school system was designed
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to take Indigenous children and place them in a civilized environment.222 Under this system
many Indigenous children suffered physical, emotional, and cultural abuse causing wide-spread
intergenerational trauma.223 As a result of this tragedy, Canada established the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (“Commission”) to address the harms caused by residential
schools.224
The Commission was established to facilitate reconciliation among Canada’s residential
school survivors and all Canadians.225 As part of its final report, the Commission emphasized
that effectively combating the pervasive effects of colonialism, which gave rise and justified
the existence residential schools, requires Canada to adopt a holistic approach which includes
facilitating Indigenous economic development and fiscal autonomy. For example, the
Commission’s Final Report highlighted the importance of economic development by noting
“the scope of reconciliation must extend beyond residential schools to encompass all aspects
of Aboriginal and non-aboriginal relations and connection to the land.”226
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Achieving reconciliation requires a strong appreciation for the linkage between Indigenous
fiscal autonomy, cultures, and political self-determination.227 Without fiscal autonomy,
Indigenous nations cannot have the freedom necessary to protect their cultural practices. For
example, in Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, the Human Rights Committee concluded that
control over natural resource development over ancestral lands was critical to the cultural
survival of the Lubicon Lake Band.228
Similarly, Indigenous fiscal autonomy is strongly connected to Indigenous political
determination.229 The main vehicle for achieving Indigenous political determination is through
self-government.230 However, meaningful self-government requires institutions with the ability
to make policy without reliance and accountability to other levels of government. This cannot be
achieved if Indigenous governments are reliant upon conditional funding agreements subjecting
them to the priorities and ideologies of colonial governments.231
The importance of fiscal autonomy to cultural identity and political determination has been
verified by the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (“Harvard
Project”).232 The Harvard Project was created by Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt to
understand the conditions necessary for fostering “sustained, self-determined social and
economic development.”233 The results indicate that successful economic development requires a
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degree of tribal sovereignty allowing Indigenous nations to develop institutions and strategies
free from external influences.234
The linkage between fiscal autonomy, self-determination and cultural survival is reflected in
UNDRIP.235 As a result, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission strongly recommends the full
and meaningful implementation of UNDRIP to achieve reconciliation.236 While UNDRIP
contains numerous provisions, the right to self-determination is critical to the meaningful
implementation of all other rights contained within UNDRIP.237 Since self-determination cannot
be achieved without effective self-government and effective self-government requires fiscal
independence, Canada is required to take the necessary steps to facilitate fiscal independence.238
The importance of fiscal autonomy to self-determination and reconciliation is most evident in
articles 3, 4, and 20 of UNDRIP:239
Article 3: Indigenous Peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
Article 4: Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 20(1): Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their
political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of
their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their
traditional and other economic activities.
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However, encouraging and facilitating Indigenous economic development by itself is not
sufficient to ensure Indigenous nations’ right to self-determination is respected.240 The
changing legal and political attitudes towards Indigenous nations has led the Canadian
government to implement policies facilitating Indigenous economic development.241
However, the Federal and Provincial governments still have the ability to influence and
undermine Indigenous economic interests through taxation. The Constitution Act of 1982
grants taxation rights to the federal and provincial governments.242 While the Indian Act and
Income Tax Act contain exemptions for Indigenous peoples and governments, they fail to
respect Indigenous autonomy and, therefore, impede their right to self-determination.243
In addition to undermining Indigenous economic interests through the ability to tax
Indigenous resources, current tax laws hinder Indigenous governments’ ability to develop
political, economic, and social systems of governance. The ability to tax Indigenous lands,
resources and peoples allows colonial governments to control Indigenous lands, resources
and peoples.244 By preventing Indigenous nations from raising revenue through taxation and
by taxing indigenous interests, the Canadian government has forced Indigenous governments
to rely on federal fiscal transfers.245 By undermining Indigenous governments’ ability to
finance themselves, they have become subject to the priorities of the federal government.246
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By becoming subject to the priorities of other levels of government, Indigenous nations’
abilities to develop their own political, economic and social institutions have been
undermined.247

Section 3.4-Canadian Legislation and Indigenous Taxation Rights and
Exemptions: A Need for Reform
This section explores Canadian laws impacting Indigenous taxation rights and
exemptions248 and argues that these laws fail to facilitate the meaningful implementation of
UNDRIP. The laws contained within the Indian Act and Income Tax Act are a continuation of
Canada’s colonization project with minor modifications.249 By failing to recognize Indigenous
peoples’ inherent right to control their tax jurisdiction, Canada has severely undermined
Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and territorial management.250 Without an ability
to manage their lands and resources, Indigenous nations’ will be lacking an essential element for
self-determination.251
The meaningful implementation of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination
requires Parliament to acknowledge and give effect to Indigenous nations’ right to control
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economic activity within their jurisdiction, which includes tax policies.252 In Mitchell v MNR,
Justice Binnie explains that Crown Sovereignty did not terminate Indigenous sovereignty.
Instead, the assertion of Crown Sovereignty gave effect to the idea of “merged sovereignty.” The
concept of merged sovereignty reflects the fact that Indigenous nations are not subordinate to
Crown sovereignty.253 If Justice Binnie’s reasoning is to have legal effect, Canadian laws
controlling or delegating taxation rights and exemption to Indigenous nations must reflect
Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to control taxation rights and privileges within their own
sovereign sphere.
This section explores the origins and purpose of sections 87 of the Indian Act, section 149
of the Income Tax Act and section 83 of the Indian Act, concluding that they fail to recognize and
give effect to Indigenous nations’ inherent right to self-government. It will be argued that section
87 of the Indian Act and section 149 of the Income Tax Act are premised upon the superior status
of Crown sovereignty. Any tax exemptions enjoyed by Indigenous nations as a result of section
87 of the Indian Act or section 149 of the Income Tax Act is a result of the Crown’s good will.
On the other hand, section 83 of the Indian Act represents a mere delegation of taxation rights. It
fails to recognize and acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to control economic
activity within their jurisdiction. Aligning Canadian laws and policies with the principles
contained within UNDRIP would give effect to the idea of merged sovereignty and would form
the necessary foundation upon which Canada and Indigenous nations can negotiate tax
agreements.
252
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3.4.1-Section 87 of the Indian Act Tax Exemption
Section 87 of the Indian Act is a continuation of colonial policy exempting Indigenous
peoples from taxation. The origins of statutory tax exemptions can be traced to an Act of the
Province of Canada passed in 1850.254 This exemption was continued, with minor modifications,
with the passage of the first version of the Indian Act in 1867.255 The purpose of section 87 tax
exemption is to protect property allocated to Indigenous peoples by the Crown.256 Mitchell v
Peguis Indian Band involved a dispute arising when an invalid tax was imposed upon the Peguis
Indian Band by Manitoba Hydro for the sale of electricity on reserve.257 Despite the case
revolving around the ability of a court to issue a garnishing order against Indigenous personal
property, La Forest J offers a judicial interpretation on the purpose of section 87 of the Indian
Act. La Forest J. reasons that section 87 is rooted in Indigenous peoples’ acknowledgment of the
ultimate sovereignty of the Crown. On this basis, he reasons “the exemption from taxation and
distraint have historically protected the ability of Indians to benefit from this property in two
ways. First, they guard against the possibility that one branch of government will erode the full
measure of the benefits given by that branch of government entrusted with the supervision of
Indian affairs. …”258
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While s 87 of the Indian Act exempts certain indigenous interest from federal and
provincial taxation,259 it fails to adequately respect Indigenous nations’ right to selfdetermination. First, it is premised upon Indigenous peoples’ acceptance of Crown sovereignty
over Indigenous peoples and lands, which is factually incorrect.260 And second, self-determining
peoples have the right to develop their own political and cultural institutions free of the
supervision of a sovereign authority (i.e., Canada).261 This is simply not the case for section 87
tax exemption. It is a matter of well settled law that section 87 of the Indian Act represents a
right to an exemption as opposed to an immunity from tax.262 The Indian Act exemption is
contingent upon the federal government’s legislative will as a sovereign authority with the power
to control Indigenous peoples’ economic and political affairs.263

3.4.1A-Limitations of Section 87 of the Indian Act
As a right to an exemption based upon Canada’s sovereignty over Indigenous nations,
section 87 stands in the way of Indigenous economic development and territorial management.
The limitations of section 87 of the Indian Act have caused Indigenous peoples to engage in
extensive litigation and spend significant resources structuring business activity in order to retain
wealth within their communities.264 This is a result of the inherent limitation in section 87 of the
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Indian Act.265 In order for section 87 to apply, Indigenous peoples must meet three conditions.266
First, the property in question must be held by an “Indian” or “Indian band” as defined by the
Indian Act.267 Second, the property in question must be “personal property”.268 And third, the
personal property must be situated on reserve.269
The complexity of determining the situs of income has permitted government officials to
limit the application of tax exemptions applicable to both employment and business income.270
The leading case for determining the situs of income is Williams v Canada (Williams).271 In
Williams the Supreme Court created a test for determining the situs of employment income.
Shortly after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Williams v Canada, the Federal Court
narrowed the scope of section 87 for business income by requiring income earned by an
Indigenous business to be “integral to the life of the reserve”.272 It was not until 2011 that the
Supreme Court reversed the Federal Court’s decision, broadening the scope of section 87 by
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affirming the “connecting factors” in Williams and decreasing the importance of the connection
between the income and “traditional native ways of life.”273
Another significant impediment to wealth generation and retention on reserves is the fact
that section 87 tax exemption only applies to status Indians or bands.274 As a result, if Indigenous
peoples or government decide to incorporate to further their business interests, they will lose the
benefits of section 87 of the Indian Act, regardless of whether the controlling shareholder is an
“Indian” or “band”.275 As a result, Indigenous peoples have to engage in significant tax planning
in order to balance business and tax considerations including income tax, GST, PST and other
indirect taxes.276 For example, Indians or Indian bands277 will incorporate and enter into
management services agreements in order to access the benefits of incorporation while
maintaining the section 87 exemption.278

3.4.1B-Section 87 of the Indian Act and UNDRIP
Section 87 of the Indian Act fails to provide Indigenous peoples with a means of
financing their autonomous function and developing their social, political and economic
institutions. Therefore section 87, as currently worded and interpreted, cannot be used to
meaningfully implement articles 3, 4 and 20 of UNDRIP.279 First, section 87 cannot respect
Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as it is a continuation of colonial paternalistic
attitudes towards Indigenous peoples and interferes with Indigenous people’s ability to freely
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pursue their economic development.280 Second, section 87 fails to protect Indigenous
governments’ tax base and, therefore, hinders their ability to finance their own autonomous
function.281 And third, by failing to prevent other levels of government from taxing Indigenous
interests, section 87 fails to promote Indigenous peoples ability to develop their own political
and economic institutions.282
Section 87 of the Indian Act fails to acknowledge Indigenous nations’ sovereignty over
taxation rights within their jurisdiction. A critical element of self-government and territorial
management is the ability to control economic activity within Indigenous jurisdiction.283 In other
words, self-government and territorial management involves a degree of sovereignty.284 Section
87 is premised on Crown sovereignty and is paternalistic in nature.285 As paternalistic legislation
premised on Crown sovereignty over Indigenous nations, section 87 cannot provide Indigenous
peoples with the right to self-determination. According to the courts, the purpose of section 87 is
to protect Indigenous property in exchange for Indigenous peoples’ acknowledgement and
acceptance of Crown sovereignty. Indigenous peoples have never accepted Crown sovereignty
over them.286
Section 87 fails to promote the development of Indigenous political and economic
institutions. The development of Indigenous political and economic institutions requires
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Indigenous nations to have the ability to generate revenues from individuals and persons engaged
in economic activities within Indigenous territories.287 While section 87 does not concern
Indigenous governments’ right to tax, it fails to protect Indigenous governments’ tax base. By
failing to protect Indigenous resources, section 87 cannot meaningfully facilitate Indigenous
governments’ ability to develop institutions and competencies necessary for self-government and
territorial management.288

3.4.2-Municipal and Public Body Exemption section 149 of the Income Tax Act
Section 149 of the Income Tax Act provides Indigenous government with tax protections
if they are performing the function of a public body. Unlike section 87 of the Indian Act,
paragraph 149(1)(c) (Public body exemption) of the Income Tax Act has been interpreted broadly
and provides Indigenous nations the widest possible exemption from taxation.289 Paragraph
149(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act exempts municipalities and public bodies performing the
function of government in Canada from Part I income taxation.290 Prior to 2016, the ability of an
Indigenous government to utilize the public body exemption was determined on a case-by-case
basis.291 By 2016, the CRA adopted a policy considering all bands, as defined by the Indian Act,
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to be public bodies performing the function of government.292 The CRA’s position is supported
by bands’ ability (1) to create by-laws for the benefit of the community; (2) to levy taxes and
impose fines; (3) to manage reserve lands, resources and finances; and (4) to govern (within the
framework of the Indian Act).293
While section 149 of the Income Tax Act provides Indigenous government with a broad
tax exemption, it is nonetheless limited. Section 149 is premised upon the Crown sovereignty
over Indigenous nations and only applies to a small subset of Indigenous governments. For
example, paragraph 149(1)(c) only applies to Indigenous governments that are considered a
“municipality” or “public body”.294 Furthermore, legal entities separate from the public body
cannot benefit from the exemption unless they meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 149(1)(d.5)
and 149(d.6).295 For example, in order for legal entities owned by Indigenous public bodies to
benefit from subsection 149(1)(c) at least 90% of income must be generated on reserve. In other
words, paragraphs 149(1)(d.5) and 149(d.6) are limited in terms of “capital” ownership and
geographic location where income is earned.296

3.4.2.1-Section 149 and UNDRIP
Section 149 of the Income Tax Act provides Indigenous nations with a limited ability to
achieve self-determination. By exempting Indigenous governing bodies from taxation, section
149 of the Income Tax Act permits Indigenous governing bodies to generate revenues without
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federal or provincial interference.297 Allowing Indigenous government to generate their own
revenues, which are not subject to accounting or reporting requirements imposed by the federal
government, enhances their ability to achieve self-determination.298 However, the ability to
generate revenue and self-govern is achieved within a system premised on the sovereignty of the
Crown over Indigenous nations and within tightly controlled parameters. First, in order to be
used by Indigenous governing bodies paragraph 149(1)(c) must be used by an unincorporated
entity, forcing Indigenous governments to be exposed to third-party liability.299 Second, section
149(1)(c) does not apply to Indigenous governing bodies that do not fit the definition of a “band”
within the Indian Act.300
Limiting the application of paragraph 149(1)(c) to bands as defined by the Indian Act
severely limits Indigenous nations’ ability to develop their own political and economic
institutions. One of the major critiques of Canada’s attempts to grant Indigenous peoples the
right to self-determination and jurisdiction over resources is that it is too narrow and represents
“little more than a modified version of the status quo.”301 Since the tax exemption in paragraph
149(1)(c) is confined to “bands” as determined by the federal government, it is arguably nothing
more than a continuation of the status quo.
Furthermore, an essential element of self-government and determination is the ability to
generate revenue from a government’s own jurisdiction in order to develop independent political
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and economic institutions.302 The tax exemptions contained within section 149 of the Income Tax
Act do not grant Indigenous nations the authority to collect revenues from individuals or persons
deriving value from Indigenous lands and resources.303 The exemption is limited to revenues
generated by business activity of the public body itself and, therefore, does not go as far as
implementing articles 3,4 or 20 of UNDRIP.

3.4.3-Property Taxation, Indigenous Self-Governance and UNDRIP
Recent developments granting Indigenous nations the legal right to impose property taxes
on non-Indigenous leaseholds located on reserves have had the effect of promoting the
development of Indigenous economic and political institutions, which will in turn facilitate selfgovernment.304 Historically, Indigenous nations had no authority to impose property tax on nonindigenous persons with interests located on reserve lands.305 By preventing Indigenous nations
from imposing property tax and by failing to protect Indigenous tax jurisdiction, Canada has
permitted provincial, municipal and local governments to impose property taxation on
Indigenous interests without requiring them to provide services in exchange.306 In 1988,
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Parliament enacted legislation enabling Indigenous governments to tax non-Indigenous property
interests located on reserve.307 By extending the right to tax property interests on reserve to
Indigenous governments, Parliament promoted the development of Indigenous economic and
political institutions.308
This section proceeds by outlining the conditions giving rise to the 1988 Indian Act
amendment granting Indigenous nations the right to tax non-indigenous interests located on
reserve. It then highlights the benefits that can arise from protecting Indigenous tax jurisdiction
and granting Indigenous nations the legal right to tax organizations conducting business on
reserve. Finally, it argues that while the 1988 amendment is a step in the right direction that has
promoted the development of Indigenous economic and political institutions, it is nonetheless
limited. It will be argued that the 1988 amendment is problematic in that it is premised upon
Crown Sovereignty over Indigenous peoples and is a continuation of the old practice of replacing
traditional systems of governance with inferior municipal style band government. In order to
maintain the benefits arising from initiatives such as the 1988 amendment while respecting
Indigenous sovereignty, Parliament must enact legislation recognizing Indigenous peoples’
inherent right to control tax policy within Indigenous jurisdiction. Initiatives such as the 1988
amendment would then be premised upon Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to control taxation
rights and privileges within Indigenous jurisdiction.
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3.4.3.1-Property Taxation on Reserve Lands: Pre-1988
In the Province of British Columbia,309 forty-five reserves were located within the
boundaries of various British Columbian governments. These governments collected property
taxes from leaseholds occupied by non-Indigenous peoples on reserve lands.310 There are a
number of issues that arise when local governments collect property taxes on Indigenous
reserves. First, while local governments have the legal authority to collect property taxes, they
have no legal requirement to provide services in exchange for the taxes collected.311 Second, by
imposing property taxes on reserve lands without providing services, local government lowered
the value of reserve lands.312 Third, imposing taxes on Indigenous reserves undermined
Indigenous governments’ abilities to manage their own territories.313 As a result, Indigenous
nations strongly opposed property taxes imposed by non-Indigenous governments. Indigenous
opposition created administrative difficulties with the collection of delinquent taxes.314 For
example, in 1986 the British Columbia Provincial Surveyor of Taxes reported a 59.8%
delinquency rate on current and back taxes on reserves.315
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The issues surrounding the imposition of property taxes on Indigenous lands led to the
development of Bill C-115. Bill C-115 was developed by Kamloops Indian Band Chief Manny
Jules and received support from Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, resulting in the 1988
amendment to the Indian Act (Kamloops Amendment).316 The purpose of Bill C-115 was to
clarify Indigenous jurisdiction over “designated lands”. Designated lands are conditionally
surrendered reserve lands that remain part of Indigenous reserves.317 The Kamloops amendment,
through section 83, granted Indigenous nations the right to impose property taxes on designated
lands.318
By granting Indigenous nations the authority to impose taxes on designated lands, the
Kamloops amendment created Indigenous property tax jurisdiction which increased revenue
options for Indigenous nations and expanded their jurisdictional authority.319 However,
Indigenous tax jurisdiction granted by the Kamloops Amendment did not oust the provincial and
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local governments’ ability to impose property taxes on Indigenous property.320 In British
Columbia, this issue was resolved with the passage of provincial legislation clarifying the effects
of section 83 of the Indian Act on provincial tax authority.321
The passage of Bill C-115 required British Columbia to reassess its taxing practices and
laws affecting Indigenous reserve lands. British Columbia responded with Bills 77 and 64.322 Bill
77 was shortly replaced by Bill 64 as it failed to address the issue of taxing Indigenous lands
without the authority of Indigenous nations and without requiring local government to provide
services.323 Bill 64, the Indian Self Government Enabling Act, provided Indigenous nations with
three taxation options: (1) concurrent property tax jurisdiction; (2) independent property tax
jurisdiction; and (3) Indian Districts organizations.324 The different options allowed Indigenous
nations to have choice in structuring their relationships with local governments.325
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3.4.3.1-Indigenous Tax Jurisdiction: A Path Towards Self-Determination?
The Kamloops Amendment resulted in the creation of a number of Indigenous
institutions furthering Indigenous economic and political development. Examples of Indigenous
institutions include the Indian Taxation Advisory Board (ITAB), First Nations Tax Commission
(FNTC), First Nations Financial Management Board (FMB), and the First Nations Finance
Authority (FNFA). Furthermore, the Kamloops Amendment encouraged Parliament to pass a
number of Acts facilitating Indigenous economic development and resource management.326

3.4.3.1A-Indian Taxation Advisory Board (ITAB)
ITAB was responsible for the regulation of Indigenous property tax.327 When section 83 of
the Indian Act was amended to allow Indigenous nations to impose property taxes on nonIndigenous leaseholders, Indigenous nations had no experience designing or administering
property taxes.328 As a result, ITAB was established in 1989 by the Department of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development (DIAND) to assist in the implementation of section 83 of the Indian
Act. DIAND described the purpose of ITAB by stating:
The Board’s primary purpose is to provide recommendations to the Minister on the
approval of taxation by-laws, and to promote the exercise of these new Indian taxation
powers. The Board represents a new concept in that it is the first Indian-controlled
administrative body to be involved in the exercise of the Minister’s decision-making
power under the Indian Act.329
ITAB would achieve its goals by providing Indigenous nations with the necessary skills
to efficiently administer property taxes. For example, ITAB hired experienced professionals to
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teach courses focused on assessment policies and practices, appeals, rate setting, and collection
systems and enforcement.330
Establishing ITAB led to the development of Indigenous institutions and provided a road
map for the future Indigenous economic development within the Canadian federation. However,
it also highlighted the need to develop institutions with the ability to develop a framework for
navigating the fiscal and service relationships between Indigenous governments and federal and
provincial governments.331 This led to the enactment of various pieces of legislation and the
development of a number of institutions designed to address these challenges.332

3.4.3.1B-First Nation Tax Commission (FNTC)
Prior to the enactment of the First Nations Fiscal Management Act (FMA) in 2005,
Indigenous nations’ authority to impose property taxes was subject to Ministerial approval
through section 83 of the Indian Act.333 In 2005, the FMA was passed resulting in the
establishment of the First Nations Tax Commission (FNTC), the successor of ITAB, an
institution with federal law-approval powers.334
The creation of FNTC with federal-law approval powers appears to grant Indigenous
nations greater independence in the design and implementation of their own property taxation
policies. However, while the Minister no longer enjoys a veto power over property tax by-laws
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enacted through the FMA, the Minister retains control over the appointment process of all
commissioners serving as part of the FNTC.335
Despite not providing Indigenous nations with complete autonomy in developing and
administering their property tax regime, the FMA has helped facilitate Indigenous economic
development, service delivery and fiscal integration.336 The FMA achieves its goal by creating
the regulatory framework necessary for the development of Indigenous revenue and expenditure
systems.337 By establishing the FNTC, First Nations Financial Management Board (FMB)338 and
the First Nations Finance Authority (FNFA)339, the FMA creates the necessary institutions for
revenue generation and financial management.

3.4.3.1C-First Nations Financial Management Board (FMB)
The FMB aids Indigenous nations in developing their economies by ensuring they have
the proper regulatory framework in place.340 The FMB has a number of purposes including but
not limited to assisting First Nations in managing their shared fiscal responsibilities with other
levels of government, and establishing, maintaining and improving Indigenous financial relations
with financial institutions and third parties.341 The purpose of the FMB is to provide confidence
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in Indigenous financial management systems to taxpayers, the Indigenous community and
investors.342
The FMB helps in the development of Indigenous fiscal capabilities and institutions in a
cooperative effort with the federal government. The FMA requires the FMB to be composed of a
minimum of 9 and a maximum of 13 directors.343 The Minister controls the appointment of the
Chairperson. However, the remaining directors are appointed by the Governor in Council and the
Aboriginal Financial Officer Association.344

3.4.3.1D-First Nations Finance Authority (FNFA)
The FNFA helps provide Indigenous nations with financing through capital markets. In
1992, a group of Indigenous leaders contemplated a non-profit Indigenous owned and controlled
institution which would provide Indigenous governments with financing.345 With the passage of
the First Nation Fiscal Management Act in 2005, the First Nations Fiscal Management Authority
(FNFA) was established.346 The FNFA is a voluntary non-profit organization without share
capital.347 Its purpose is to secure the borrowing of members through the use of property tax
revenues.348 To provide short and long-term borrowing options for its members, the FNFA
provides investment services such as the creation of borrowing pools through the marketing and
sale of debentures.349
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3.4.3.2-The First Nations Fiscal Management Act and UNDRIP
Recognizing and protecting Indigenous nations’ right to tax non-Indigenous persons with
leaseholds on reserve has promoted Indigenous economic development and the development of
Indigenous economic and political institutions.350 However, the Kamloops amendment falls short
in meeting Canada’s obligation to promote Indigenous self-determination as it is premised on
Crown sovereignty over Indigenous nations and is a continuation the old practice of replacing
traditional Indigenous systems of governance with municipal style band governments.351 Only
Indigenous nations that conform to the federal government’s idea of what responsible and
accountable government entail are permitted to levy property taxes on non-indigenous
leaseholders situated on reserve.352 Articles 3, 4 and 20 of UNDRIP require Canada to forge a
nation-to-nation relationship that recognizes and respects Indigenous peoples right to selfdetermination.353 In order to meaningfully implement articles 3, 4, and 20 of UNDRIP Canada
must take actions which recognize Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to self-governance
independent of Canada’s influence and control.354 This can be done by recognizing Indigenous
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nations’ inherent right to control tax policy as it relates to Indigenous peoples and corporations
deriving value from Indigenous lands.355
The goal of providing Indigenous nations with the ability to self-govern and determine
their own destinies, is part of the larger goal of addressing the destructive effects colonialism has
had on Indigenous peoples.356 Addressing the destructive effects of colonialism requires undoing
colonial systems of domination and oppression.357 Colonial domination in Canada has followed a
two-pronged approach: (1) bureaucratic control; and (2) economic exploitation.358 While
Canada’s shifting politics combined with increased public awareness have decreased the extent
to which Canada will economically exploit Indigenous peoples, the bureaucratic mechanisms of
control remain intact.359 For example, the purpose of the Kamloops amendment is to enable
Indigenous nations to self-govern.360 However, the wording of section 83 of the Indian Act and
the FNFMA ensure that ultimate control rests with the Crown.361
Meaningfully implementing Indigenous peoples right to self-determination requires
colonial governments to take actions recognizing Indigenous peoples inherent right to self-
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determination and government.362 Meaningful recognition of Indigenous peoples right to selfdetermination is achieved through actions unwinding the bureaucratic mechanisms of control
used to assimilate indigenous peoples into Canadian society.363 Recognizing Indigenous peoples’
inherent right to control tax policy within their own jurisdiction by using UNDRIP to restructure
tax relations between the Crown and Indigenous nations would highlight the Canadian
government’s seriousness in facilitating Indigenous self-determination.364 Unlike section 83, the
recognition of Indigenous nations’ right to their own tax base would be premised upon
Indigenous nations’ inherent right to control their economic destinies.365
Taxation and economic development are intricately interwind.366 Recognizing and
protecting Indigenous people right to control tax policy within their own jurisdiction is critical
for building Indigenous economies.367 Unlike Canada’s economy368, Indigenous economies are
built upon foundations which balance social, economic and political concerns. Indigenous
economies protect Indigenous peoples, cultures and worldviews.369 For example, “Anishinaabe
economies are based on Minobimaastisiiwin—intimate knowledge of a place—and the principle
of minobimaatisiiwin, meaning good life, characterized by “continuous rebirth.””370 Therefore,
362
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the development of Indigenous economies requires Indigenous control over economic design,
including tax policies.371
Recognizing Indigenous peoples’ inherent right to control economic policy within their
jurisdictions by enacting legislation recognizing that right would promote Indigenous fiscal
autonomy and break away from Canada’s symbolic actions maintaining the status quo. Canada
has maintained a policy of granting Indigenous peoples limited rights which maintain the status
quo. For example, Indigenous peoples are granted a right to hunt or fish but can only do so in a
limited manner.372 The courts have been reluctant to recognize Indigenous peoples right to
manage their lands and interest because of a fear of interfering with non-indigenous rights and
other constitutional concerns.373
As a result of Canada’s concerns with the effects of recognizing Indigenous rights, it has
preferred to implement Indigenous rights through negotiated agreements.374 The recognition of
Indigenous nations’ right to control taxation policies within their jurisdiction will serve as the
foundation for future fiscal agreements. Furthermore, exempting Indigenous citizens from
taxation would have little effect on federal and provincial rights and budgets.375 The exemption
of corporations deriving value from reserves would clear up space for Indigenous nations to raise
revenue needed for economic, social and political development.376 Finally, the taxation of
corporations does not raise issues of “taxation without representation” that have been subject to
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controversy with the imposition of property taxation on non-indigenous leaseholders living on
reserve.377

377

See e.g. Kesselman, supra note 306.
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Chapter 4 - Canada’s Fiscal Constitution
Implementing UNDRIP within the Canadian federation requires that fiscal arrangements
between Canada and Indigenous nations adopt a rights-based approach that respects Indigenous
nations’ inherent right to self-determination. Unfortunately, the current fiscal relations between
Canada and Indigenous nations are paternalistic, inefficient, and harmful.378 In implementing
UNDRIP, Canada must develop a new fiscal arrangement that recognizes Indigenous peoples’
right to develop fiscal policies within their jurisdictions.379 This is supported by the Government
of Canada’s Statement of Principle respecting the Government of Canada’s relationship with
Indigenous peoples which states “The Government of Canada recognizes that reconciliation and
self-government require a renewed fiscal relationship, developed in collaboration with
Indigenous nations, that promotes a mutually supportive climate for economic partnership and
resource development.”380 A new and more equitable fiscal relationship can be achieved through
various mechanisms including new tax arrangements.381
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As a federal state, Canada has developed a complex fiscal constitution governing fiscal
relations between the federal and provincial governments while ignoring Indigenous nations.382
“Fiscal constitution” is a term used to refer to “the body of fundamental laws and regulations that
frames decision-making in the area of fiscal policy.”383 Canada’s fiscal constitution was first
developed with the passage of the British North America Act (BNA)384 which allocated taxation
powers to the federal and provincial governments.385 The BNA was silent in regard to Indigenous
taxation rights.
Canada’s fiscal constitution can evolve to accommodate Indigenous nations’ right to selfdetermination. The Canadian Constitution provides us with a partial understanding of the everchanging laws and regulations shaping taxation and fiscal transfers in Canada. Fiscal
arrangements between the federal government and the provinces have mostly been shaped
through negotiated agreements between the executives of the various governments making up
Canada.386 These negotiations were undertaken in response to the changing social and economic
needs of the federation.387 Given Canada’s commitment to achieve reconciliation with
Indigenous nations, Canada’s fiscal constitution must further evolve to facilitate Indigenous
fiscal autonomy.388
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Chapter 3 is broken down into three parts. Part 1 begins by providing a brief overview of
where Indigenous nations fit within Canada’s fiscal landscape. It explores the fiscal
arrangements present within Canada with a focus on federal and provincial money raising and
spending powers and explores fiscal federalism as it governs federal-provincial social and
economic policies. Part 1 concludes by arguing that the current fiscal structure fails to promote
or respect Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and government. Part 2 canvasses the
special relationship Canada has to Indigenous peoples. Canada’s relationship to Indigenous
peoples requires it to not only alter its approach to funding Indigenous services but also take
steps recognizing Indigenous sovereignty over fiscal matters falling within Indigenous
jurisdiction. Part 3 explores Canada’s commitment to promoting Indigenous self-government and
argues that the recognition of Indigenous taxation rights is an essential element of meaningful
self-government.

4.1.1-The Canadian Federation
The Canadian federation, established in 1867 in an effort to facilitate economic growth,
territorial expansion and national defense, has the potential to accommodate Indigenous
autonomy and self-government.389 The diversity that existed within the territories now referred to
as Canada, required a political system of governance that divided power between a central
federal legislature and the provincial legislatures.390 This arrangement has permitted the federal
government to pursue policies facilitating economic growth, territorial expansion and national
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defense while at the same time respecting provincial autonomy.391 In other words, it provided the
provinces with the autonomy needed to develop their own societies by enacting their own laws
and policies within their designated sovereign spheres of jurisdiction.392
The division of powers found in the Constitution Act reflect the underlying motivations
in establishing Canada as a federalist state. In 1867, the major objective of creating a
confederation was economic development through regional integration.393 As a result, the federal
government was assigned the power to raise revenues by “any mode or system of taxation” while
the provinces were limited to raising revenues through direct taxation.394 The federal
government’s expansive revenue raising powers corresponded to the expenditure requirements of
establishing a national economy.395
In establishing Canada as a federalist state, Indigenous populations had little to no
political power and as a result were considered a federal responsibility under section 91(24) of
the Constitution Act, 1982.396 The terms of establishing Canada were initially negotiated by the
Province of Canada (Ontario and Quebec), New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Once the
negotiations were concluded, the British Parliament passed the BNA (now known as the
Constitution Act, 1867), establishing Canada.397 As a result, Indigenous sovereignty was ignored,
and the Crown viewed Indigenous peoples as subjects of the state.398
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4.1.2-Fiscal Federalism and Provincial Economic Unity
Federal states like Canada have developed mechanisms for ensuring relative economic
equality between the various regions making up the federation. Relative economic equality is
necessary for the provision of comparable essential services to citizens of the various regions
within the federation. This section explores the mechanisms the federal government employs to
ensure the provinces have the necessary funds to provide comparable levels of social services.
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with an appreciation of the fiscal
arrangements allowing various governments to operate within their own sovereign spheres and
contrast that to the paternalistic and inadequate fiscal arrangements the federal government has
with Indigenous nations.399
Canada has developed two main systems of intergovernmental transfers to address fiscal
imbalances between the federal and provincial governments. From the 1940s onward, Canada
experienced a rapid expansion of the welfare state.400 As a result, the responsibilities of
provincial governments in service development and delivery increased dramatically which
resulted in a corresponding increase in provincial financial obligations.401 The increasing
provincial financial obligations resulted fiscal imbalances. As a result, Canada developed a
system of intergovernmental transfers to address fiscal imbalance between the provinces
themselves and between the provinces and the federal government.402
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Fiscal imbalances in a federal state such as Canada can be broken down into vertical
fiscal imbalances (VFI) and horizontal fiscal imbalances (HFI). VFIs and HFIs are used to
balance the discrepancies between provincial revenues and responsibilities arising out of an
expansive federal revenue base and wealth discrepancies between the provinces.403 Vertical
fiscal imbalances refer to a mismatch between federal revenues and expenditure
responsibilities.404 Horizontal fiscal imbalances refer to a mismatch between provincial revenues
resulting from the different economic conditions present within the provinces.405 To address
horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances, the federal government developed two types of
transfers: conditional and unconditional transfers.406
Vertical fiscal imbalances are remedied through conditional federal fiscal transfers to the
provinces. Federal transfers intended to address vertical fiscal imbalances usually have modest
conditions attached to them. For example, funds transferred must be spent in areas falling under
provincial jurisdiction (i.e., healthcare). These transfers are made through the federal spending
power.407
Horizontal fiscal imbalances are a result of the provinces varying abilities to raise
revenues for public service delivery.408 Horizontal fiscal imbalances are remedied through a
fiscal transfer system known as equalization.409 The rationale for equalization payments is to
ensure that Canadian citizens enjoy comparable services at a comparable level of taxation
regardless of where in Canada they reside.410 Equalization transfers are unconditional transfers
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received by provinces with smaller tax bases.411 Provincial per capita equalization transfers are
calculated measuring provincial tax capacity compared to a national standard.412

4.1.3- Federalism, Social Programs & Indigenous Peoples
Indigenous peoples were neglected in the development of social programs across the
country. For almost 100-years, Canada aimed to assimilate Indigenous peoples into Canadian
society. Canadian federalism and Crown sovereignty are premised the doctrine of discovery.413
The doctrine of discovery ignored the existence of Indigenous peoples in the territories now
referred to as Canada.414 As a result, for the first 100 years post-confederation Canada adopted a
policy of assimilation or annihilation. Indigenous peoples that failed to integrate into Canadian
society were placed on reserve lands. Reserves were often harsh lands that were difficult to live
on. By placing Indigenous peoples on reserves and by preventing Indigenous peoples from
engaging in traditional activities necessary for survival, Canada hoped Indigenous peoples would
die from disease or starvation.415 The government’s goal would be achieved by adopting an
“enough to keep them alive” policy where rations were provided sparingly and only to the
elderly and ill.416
Following the Second World War, Canada implemented various social assistance policies
and programs aimed at creating minimal living standards for Canadians.417 Both the federal and
provincial governments implemented social services legislation within their spheres of
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jurisdiction.418 In doing so, the federal and provincial governments failed to take responsibility
for providing services to Indigenous peoples.419 The provinces argued that Indigenous peoples
were the federal government’s responsibility under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act.420 And
the federal government argued that the provision of services to Indigenous nations was a
provincial responsibility.421As a result, Indigenous peoples living on reserve were not afforded
the right to receive benefits arising from federal and provincial social programs or services.422
The federal government unsuccessfully pursued a number of different methods aimed at
transferring jurisdiction over the provision of services to Indigenous peoples to the provinces.423
In 1951, the federal government attempted to unilaterally transfer jurisdiction over the provision
of services to Indigenous peoples to the provinces by allowing provincial laws of general
application to apply to Indigenous peoples.424 However, this attempt failed as the federal
government could not force provincial governments to spend money on extending social
programs to Indigenous peoples.425 As a result, the federal government attempted to negotiate
with the provinces for the provision of services to Indigenous peoples.426 During this time the
deteriorating living conditions on reserve combined with increasing public awareness forced the
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federal government to assume responsibility for the provision of social services on reserve.427
The federal government assumed responsibility for the provision of social services through a
treasury board directive permitting the Department of Indian Affairs428 to spend federal funds on
the delivery of social programs on reserve. The amount of funding would be comparable to that
of the provinces.429

4.1.4-Fiscal Federalism and Indigenous Fiscal Autonomy
For the past 30-40 years, Canada has been transitioning from a relationship of
domination and assimilation with Indigenous nations to a relationship of reconciliation.430 Part of
the process of reconciliation involves recognizing Indigenous nations’ right to control social
policies within reserves and the provision of resources necessary to ensure that Indigenous
peoples have access to similar programs enjoyed by the rest of Canadian society.431
Unfortunately, Canada has failed to give effect to Indigenous peoples’ right to control social
policy or provide Indigenous nations with their share of Canadian resources necessary for selfadministration.432 Instead, Canada has adopted a “self-administration” policy by transferring
responsibility for service delivery to Indigenous nations.433
The “self-administration” policy is not tailored to the needs of Indigenous communities
and is paternalistic in nature.434 There are five major issues with the current Crown-Indigenous
fiscal relationship: (1) inadequate transfers; (2) inadequate and underutilized revenue generating
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opportunities; (3) unpredictable and arbitrary funding arrangements; (4) excessive administrative
and reporting requirements; and (5) excessive focus on compliance.435
The level of funding given to Indigenous communities is based upon a comparability
standard.436 Comparability standards fail to consider the conditions of Indigenous peoples and
determine the level of funding necessary for their unique needs.437 Indigenous nations have been
subjected to the government’s assimilation policies for many years. As a result, Indigenous
nations are not in a similar positions as provincial or territorial governments. They require
greater investment to build the infrastructure necessary to deliver services such as healthcare,
housing, education, etc.438
In addition to failing to tailor self-administration agreements to the needs of Indigenous
nations, the agreements are paternalistic in nature and maintain colonial relations between
Indigenous nations and the federal government.439 The Department of Indian and Northern
Development evolved into a funding agency signing “contribution agreements” with Indigenous
nations.440 Unlike federal fiscal transfers to the provinces, federal transfers Indigenous nations
often had stringent conditions attached to the funds transferred.441 In situations where an
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Indigenous nation fails to adhere to the federal government’s funding requirements, the federal
government has the right to cancel the funding or take over the management and delivery of
service on reserve.442
For example, in Thunderchild First Nation v Canada, the federal government took over
the financial management duties of five Manitoba bands after refusing to sign annual funding
agreements with the federal government.443 The dispute arose due to the federal government’s
unilateral exercise of power and systemic underfunding for essential services.444 At the federal
court Justice Locke held that INAC had the power to limit the bands abilities to administer
financial programs where bands fail to agree on conditions imposed by INAC.445 Justice Locke
confirmed the federal government’s broad power to limit the band’s ability to self-govern despite
previous criticisms at the federal court. In Attawapiskate First Nation v Canada Justice Phelan
described the funding agreements as “…essentially an adhesion contract imposed as a condition
of receiving funding.”446
The problems encountered in Thunderchild First Nation (TFN) can only be addressed by
redeveloping Indigenous-Crown fiscal relations.447 The problems arising in TFN are a result of a
fiscal arrangement that is paternalistic in nature. The current arrangement presents a difficult
choice for Indigenous nations: (a) federal paternalism and inadequate funding; or (b) self-
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administration and inadequate funding.448 By refusing to sign an agreement with unacceptable
terms, TFN was forced to endure federal paternalism with inadequate funding.449
The current fiscal arrangement allowed Justice Locke to justify the federal government’s
broad powers by arguing for the importance of protecting public funds and maintaining service
delivery on reserve. For example, in holding that INAC had the right to take over financial
management of the TFN, Justice Locke balanced the interests of the TFN with the importance of
maintaining funding for essential programs and services and the protection of public funds.450 He
therefore concluded that the federal government was justified in taking over the financial
management of the Band in situations where the Band refuses to sign a unilateral funding
agreement.451
The situation in TFN provides a prime example of how the current fiscal relations fail to
adopt a rights-based approach. In adjudicating the dispute between TFN and the Crown, Justice
Locke was constrained by the absence of laws and oversight mechanisms holding the Crown
accountable for service delivery to Indigenous nations.452 For example, Justice Locke did not
question the adequacy of funding or the federal government’s unilateral changes to the funding
agreement.453 It is therefore necessary to re-develop Crown-Indigenous relations from the current
status of government-to-administrator to that of government-to-government.
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Transforming Indigenous-Crown relations into true government-to-government relations
requires a new model for fiscal relations.454 The new fiscal relationship can come in many
forms.455 However, it must maintain elements of respect and independence similar to those found
in federal-provincial fiscal relations.456 Federal-provincial relations are guided by clear
legislation outlining the level of funding and support required for the provision of agreed upon
services.457 Accountability, transparency and respect are the hallmarks of a government-togovernment relationship based upon cooperation and partnership.458
Both the government of Canada and the Assembly of First Nations agree that a renewed
fiscal relationship can benefit from providing Indigenous peoples with the ability to generate
revenues from taxation.459 While imperfect, the First Nations Fiscal Management Act460 can
provide a starting point for the development of a new fiscal relationship between Indigenous
nations and Canada. The recognition of Indigenous nations’ right to tax non-Indigenous persons
with leaseholds on reserve has promoted Indigenous economic development and the
development of Indigenous political institutions.461 This has prompted Chief Manny Jules,
President of the First Nations Taxation Commission, to argue for the expansion of the First
Nations Fiscal Management Act framework to support greater Indigenous taxation
jurisdiction.462 The development of a new fiscal relationship can partially be achieved by the
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extension of Indigenous taxation exemptions to create space for Indigenous governments to
develop their own revenue free of the stringent conditions attached to federal transfers.

4.2-Reconciliation and Crown Obligations
The idea of granting Indigenous nations tax exemptions yet requiring the federal and/or
provincial governments to provide services is not without controversy. Groups such as the
Canadian Taxpayers Federation, a non-profit educational and advocacy organization, argues that
income is the only measure that should be used to provide tax exemption.463 Therefore, they
argue for the abolishing of the Indian Act tax exemption. More specifically they argue that
federal, provincial, and municipal taxation should apply to Indigenous peoples and interests
whether on or off reserve.464 It is interesting to note that some commentators have referred to the
Indigenous tax exemptions as “unjustified tax exemptions for on-reserve commerce and
individuals.”465 They refer to the effects of the exemption as “tax losses for government” and the
creation of “uneven playing field with off-reserve business.”466 The belief that income should be
the only measure by which tax exemption are enacted as led commentators to ponder why
Indigenous peoples are tax exempt while receiving benefits from the Canadian government.467
Arguments for the elimination of Indigenous tax exemption on the basis that “income” is
the only valid criterion for exemptions fails to consider the complex history that Indigenous
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nations have with the Crown and the Crown’s obligations arising out of this history.468
Proponents for the elimination of Indigenous tax exemptions have argued that tax exemptions do
not benefit Indigenous peoples and that scrapping the exemption is necessary to create a more
equitable society and place Indigenous peoples on equal footing with the rest of Canadian
society.469
Ignoring the unique position of Indigenous nations in Canadian society while arguing for
their integration into federal and provincial governance structures for their own benefit follows
the same line of reasoning found in Jean Chrétien’s 1969 White Paper.470 The White Paper
called for the elimination of the Indian Act and the full integration of Indigenous peoples into
Canadian society.471 The purpose of the White Paper was stated as the “full free and nondiscriminatory participation of Indian people in Canadian society.”472 In other words, the White
Paper argued for the assimilation of Indigenous peoples into Canadian society for their own
benefit. As a result, the White Paper received strong backlash as it failed to recognize Indigenous
autonomy and aimed to assimilate Indigenous peoples into Canadian society.473 Similarly calls
for the elimination of Indigenous tax exemptions also rely on arguments stating that eliminating
the exemptions are in the best interest of Indigenous peoples as tax exemptions fail to help
Indigenous peoples and create an “unfair” advantage for Indigenous peoples.474
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Chapter 3.2 argues that Canada has a moral and legal obligation to fund essential services
for Indigenous peoples and provide Indigenous peoples with the right to control tax policies
concerning their peoples and territories. This argument is supported by (1) the debt Canada owes
to Indigenous peoples for the theft of resources used to establish Canada; (2) the honour of the
Crown and Crown fiduciary obligations; and (3) UNDRIP.

4.2.1-Reconciliation and Restitution
The development of Indigenous economies and the provision of services to Indigenous
peoples is not an act of charity on part of the federal or provincial governments. It is a long
overdue debt that Canada has failed to pay.475 It is no coincidence that Indigenous peoples are
among the poorest peoples in Canadian society.476 For many years Canada has been stealing
Indigenous lands and resources.477 Additionally, Canada has subjected Indigenous peoples to all
forms of discrimination through the Indian Act.478 Canada’s actions towards Indigenous peoples
have had real life consequences that Indigenous peoples suffer from to this very day. Therefore,
achieving meaningful reconciliation requires Canada to take responsibility for the cost of
rebuilding Indigenous economies that Canada has destroyed.479 This section explains that the
provision of services to Indigenous nations while respecting their right to manage their
economies is not an act of charity. Indigenous nations are not benefiting from “special
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privileges” unfairly. They are merely attempting to regain the ability to self-govern and have
living standards comparable to those of the general population.480

4.2.1A-Artificial Dependence
Achieving reconciliation and respecting Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination
requires emphasizing the importance of Indigenous sovereignty481 as the basis for Indigenous
legal, social, and economic orders and overturning the narrative of Indigenous dependence.482
Critics of Indigenous tax exemptions have completely ignored Indigenous sovereignty and have
ignored the circumstances which led to Indigenous economic dependence.483 Chapter 3.2.1A
argues that the sole reason Indigenous peoples are dependent on Canada for the provision of
essential services is because of Canada’s actions which include but are not limited to stealing
Indigenous lands, restricting Indigenous economies, and committing acts of genocide aimed at
assimilating Indigenous peoples into mainstream Canadian society.484 In other words, Indigenous
dependence is a direct result of Canada’s actions. And as stated in Chapter 1, Canada
purposively structured its relations with Indigenous nations to be one of dependence to control
Indigenous peoples.485 Therefore, arguing for Canada to respect Indigenous nations’ tax
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jurisdiction while at the same time providing Indigenous nations with financial support to
achieve self-determination is not an act of charity. It is part of decolonisation necessary for
achieving Indigenous self-determination and government.486

4.2.1B-Indigenous Peoples and the Canadian Economy
Indigenous peoples have played an integral role in the development of the Canadian
economy without being fairly compensated. This chapter focuses on how Indigenous peoples
were forced to surrender lands and resources for the benefit of Canada’s economy and the way
the Canadian government has infringed and continues to infringe upon Indigenous economic
rights for the benefit of the Canadian economy. Despite Indigenous nations’ significant
contributions to the development of the Canadian economy, they have not received any
substantial benefits arising from their contributions.487 It is difficult to highlight all of Canada’s
theft of Indigenous lands and resources. This Chapter focuses on a select few examples
highlighting how Indigenous lands and resources form the backbone of Canada’s economy.488
Indigenous peoples have played and continue to play a significant role in the
development and maintenance of the Canadian economy. The Canadian economy is built around
Indigenous lands and resources. Canada generates wealth from selling, leasing, and developing
lands it does not legitimately own.489 Initially Canada justified its encroachment upon Indigenous
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territories through royal charters. For example, in 1670 investors in the Hudson’s Bay Company
(HBC) were granted a royal charter for exclusive trading rights along Hudson Bay.490 Prince
Rupert, First Governor appointed to the HBC, had a third of what is now known as Canada
named after him.491 It is important to emphasize that the HBC could not legally own Rupert’s
land as it did not occupy nor control Rupert’s land.492
Despite not legally owning Rupert’s land, the HBC sold Rupert’s land to Canada in 1869
for 300,000 pounds sterling (approximately $60 million Canadian, accounting for inflation).493
Furthermore, Rupert’s Land was sold to Canada despite the sale being in violation of the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 and the Treaty of Niagara.494 Indigenous rights or claims to land were for
the most part ignored. Article 14 of the 1870 order-in-council stated: “Any claims of Indians to
compensation for lands required for purposes of settlement shall be disposed of by the Canadian
Government in communication with the Imperial Government; and the Company shall be
relieved of all responsibility in respect of them.”495
In addition to unjustified land grabs, Canada mismanaged and stole money from
Indigenous trust funds. Indigenous trust funds were designed to hold revenues arising from the
surrender of land to the Crown.496 At the time of Confederation, it is estimated that Indigenous

490

Yellowhead, supra note 31 at 12.
Shirlee Anne Smith, “Rupert’s Land” in The Canadian Encyclopedia (7 February 2006), online:
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/ruperts-land>.
492
According to settler/Canadian law, the doctrine of discovery can justify a state’s assertion of sovereignty over
uninhabited lands. Canadian sovereignty is often justified by using the doctrine of discovery. However, for a state to
assert sovereignty over an uninhabited land, it must first occupy that land. Even if we assume that Rupert’s land was
not occupied (which is not true), the HBC would still be required to occupy the land before the doctrine of discovery
can be used to legitimize its ownership. The HBC could not legally own Rupert’s land as (1) Rupert’s land was
occupied by Indigenous peoples; and (2) the HBC did not occupy Rupert’s land. See Yellowhead, supra note 31 at
19. See also, Borrows, supra note 5 at 189.
493
Yellowhead, supra note 31 at 19.
494
Ibid.
495
Ibid.
496
Neu, supra note 4. See also, Yellowhead, supra note 31 at 12.
491

90

trust funds contributed to approximately 10% of Canada’s annual revenues.497 For example, in
1834, the Province of Upper Canada invested Six Nation’s money held in trust to fund the Grand
River Navigation Company. This investment was made without obtaining Six Nation’s
consent.498 When the Grand River Navigation Company failed, the moneys and community land
were lost and never compensated.499
One noteworthy mention on how Indigenous nations bankrolled Canada against their will
is the Dominion Lands Act.500 The Dominion Lands Act provided a blueprint for land grants to
companies in exchange for development promises.501 Numerous companies received lands at
discounted rates in exchange for the promise to build bridges, roads and to promote migration
and settlement.502 As a result, millions of settlers established homes on the territories of
Indigenous nations such as the Cree, Siksikaitsitapi (Blackfoot Confederacy), Nakoda Oyadebi
(Assiniboine), Dene, etc.503
To curb Indigenous protests Canada employed Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
The RCMP was used to remove Indigenous peoples protecting their lands.504 Furthermore,
Canada employed various measures ensuring Indigenous peoples did not politically organize to
push back against unfair “treaties” and Canada’s unilateral assertion of sovereignty.505 As a
result, Indigenous peoples were forced to sign treaties as a last resort to protect their lands.506 To
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make matters worse Canada has failed to honour the treaties signed with Indigenous nations. For
example, Canada interprets treaties as contracts of settler law as opposed to international
agreements between nations, as recommended by the UN.507
The Canadian Constitution explicitly recognizes the existence of Aboriginal economic
rights as a subset of section 35 Aboriginal rights. However, Canadian courts have limited the
extent to which Indigenous peoples can benefit from their inherent economic rights in the interest
of the Canadian population.508 In the late 1900s while Canada was contemplating Constitutional
reform the Assembly of First Nations drafted a Declaration outlining their inherent rights,
independent of Canada’s control.509 While Canada did not fully acknowledge the existence of
specific inherent rights outside of Canada’s control, Canada did acknowledge the existence of
Aboriginal rights. In 1982, the newly amended Constitution Act, 1982 recognized the existence
and provided protection for Aboriginal rights.510 Unfortunately, the Constitution Act, 1982 failed
to explain what aboriginal rights entailed and, therefore, it was left up to the courts to determine
the content and scope of Aboriginal rights.511
The Supreme Court of Canada narrowly defined Aboriginal rights by limiting such rights
to those integral and distinctive to Indigenous societies.512 However, the Supreme Court did
recognize the existence of Indigenous economic rights that are constitutionally protected.513 In
1999, the Supreme Court recognized a Mi’kmaq commercial fishing right for “moderate
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livelihood”, a term left undefined.514 In the same decision the Supreme Court maintained the
Crown’s ability to encroach upon Indigenous economic rights through regulations.515 Indigenous
economic rights can be regulated and infringed for a variety of reasons including for the benefit
of settler economic rights.516 For example, in Delgamuukw the Supreme Court stated that
Aboriginal rights can be infringed for “the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and
hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia,
protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the
settlement of foreign populations to support those aims. ..”517
Canada has often used economic regulation to maintain political power within the state
and keep Indigenous peoples dependent. For example, Canada has limited Indigenous economic
development through regulations designed to protect commercial rights of settler society. In
2014, the Criminal Code was amended to introduce harsher penalties for the trade in contraband
tobacco.518 This was seen as a necessary step in maintaining the power of the state to regulate
economic activity for the benefit of settler society and at the expense of Indigenous peoples.519
A shallow probe into Canada’s history as it relates to the theft of Indigenous lands is
sufficient to dispose of any arguments insinuating in any way that Indigenous nations are
receiving unearned benefits through tax exemptions or taxation rights. The legacy of
dispossession is that the Canadian economy is built upon stolen Indigenous wealth and that
Indigenous peoples are dependent upon the Crown. Therefore, any benefits attributed to the
Canadian economy can be linked to Indigenous dispossession. For example, Arthur Manuel
514
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describes the legacy of Indigenous land grabs as “…The wealth and economy of Canada and the
provinces is based on this colonial constitution that basically dispossesses Indigenous peoples
and makes us dependent on the federal and provincial governments. Dispossession and
dependency is humiliating and creates a great upheaval in our social, political, economic, cultural
and spiritual life.”520
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion
Canada’s colonial policies towards Indigenous nations have weakened Indigenous
economies and rendered them dependent upon the Crown. The theft of Indigenous lands, forced
relocation of Indigenous peoples into less desirable parcels of land, and the tight control over
Indigenous economies have created a relationship of dependence between Indigenous nations
and the Crown.521 The Crown’s dominant position has allowed it to structure relations with
Indigenous nations in a manner which undermines Indigenous peoples right to selfdetermination.522
In recent years, Canada has been attempting to modify its relations with Indigenous
nations and recognize their rights to self-government and self-determination.523 An integral
component of self-government is fiscal autonomy.524 Unfortunately, Canada has been slow to
adopt policies and implement laws facilitating Indigenous fiscal autonomy. In the area of
taxation, Canada maintains its ability to tax members of Indigenous nations and fails to
recognize Indigenous nations’ inherent right to control tax policies on Indigenous lands.525 On
reserves, Indigenous governments have only been granted limited rights to impose property
taxation.526 On lands to which Indigenous nations have Aboriginal title, Canada has been
extremely reluctant in negotiating and concluding tax agreements that are fair and equitable.527
With the recent enactment of Bill C-15, there is a strong argument for redeveloping
Crown-Indigenous fiscal relations using UNDRIP as a blueprint. The current Crown-Indigenous
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fiscal relations are paternalistic in nature and hinder the development of autonomous Indigenous
governments.528 For example, Indigenous governments, through fiscal transfers, are dependent
upon the Crown for funding government operations.529 The Crown’s fiscal arrangements with
Indigenous nations suffer from a number of flaws including: (1) inadequate funding; (2)
unpredictable and arbitrary funding arrangements; (3) paternalistic requirements such as
excessive reporting requirements and focus on compliance.530
In this thesis I have argued that Canada’s current laws and policies regarding Indigenous
economic rights are inadequate in promoting Indigenous self-determination. As a result, I
propose using UNDRIP as a blueprint for restructuring economic relations and focus on taxation
as a potential avenue for promoting Indigenous fiscal autonomy. Both the government of Canada
and the Assembly of First Nations believe that a renewed fiscal relationship can benefit from
providing Indigenous nations with the ability to generate revenue from taxation.531 The
promotion of Indigenous nations’ right to self-government and territorial management through
taxation can be facilitated by (1) exempting members of Indigenous communities from federal
and provincial taxation without qualification; and (2) respecting Indigenous nations’ right to tax
businesses deriving value from Indigenous lands. Recognizing and respecting Indigenous
nations’ right to control tax policy within their jurisdiction will render Canada in greater
compliance with UNDRIP.

528

Jones, supra note 56 at 31-32; See also, Neu, supra note 4 at 133. See also, Flood, supra note 1 at 99.
See e.g. Funding Agreements, supra note 66. Funding agreements are subject to unilateral modifications by the
Crown.
530
A New Fiscal Relationship, supra note 378 at 9.
531
Ibid at 16.
529

96

Bibliography
Legislation:
An Act to Amend the Dominion Elections Act, 1938, SC 1950, c 35.
Canada Assistance Plan, 1966 SC c 45.
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Department of Indigenous Services Act, SC 2019, c 29.
Forests Act, RSNS, c 179.
First Nations Land Management Act, SC 1999, c 24.
First Nations Commercial and Industrial Development Act, SC 2005, c 53.
First Nations Fiscal Management Act, SC 2005, c 9.
Gradual Enfranchisement Act, SC 1869, c 6.
Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp).
Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5.
Indian Self Government Enabling Act, RSBC, c 129.
Proclamation Relating to the Acquisition of Land, 1859, (reprinted in RSBC 1871, App No 13).
Proclamation Relating to Acquisition of Land, 1860, (reprinted in RSBC 1871, App No 15).
Royal Proclamation of 7 October, 1763, RSC 1985, App II, No 1.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, SC 2021, c 14.

97

Jurisprudence: Canada
Attawapiskat First Nation v Canada, 2012 FC 948.
Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th)
193.
Bastien Estate v Canada, 2011 SCC 38.
Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] SCR 313, 34 DLR (3d) 145.
Canadian Pacific Ltd v Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 SCR 3, 122 DLR (4th) 129.
Capital Cities Communications Inc v Canadian Radio-Television Commission, [1978] 2 SCR
141, 81 DLR (3d) 609.
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th) 193.
Dubé v Canada, 2011 SCC 39.
Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, [1981] 2 FC 317, 117 DLR (3d) 247.
Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nations v National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation
and General Workers Union of Canada, 2017 ONCA 814.
Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33.
R v Nowegijick, [1983] 2 SCR 29, 144 DLR (3d) 193.
Nevsun Resources Ltd v Araya, 2020 SCC 5.
Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation v Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation, 2019
FC 813.
Ordon Estate v Grail, [1998] 3 SCR 437, 166 DLR (4th).
R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at 53.

98

R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456, 177 DLR (4th) 513.
R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821, 138 DLR (4th) 204.
R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385.
R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289.
R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723, 137 DLR (4th) 648.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 1 DLR (4th) 385.
Southwind v Canada, 156 DLR (4th) 87, [1998] 1 CTC 265 (FCA).
Thunderchild First Nation v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2015 FC 200.
Union of New Brunswick Indians v New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [1998] 1 SCR 1161,
161 DLR (4th) 193.
Westbank First Nation v BC Hydro and Power Authority, [1999] 3 SCR 134, 176 DLR (4th) 276.
Williams v Canada, [1992] 1 SCR 877, 90 DLR (4th) 129.
William’s Lake Indian Band v Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2018
SCC 4.

Jurisprudence: United States
Washington v Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 US 134, 100 SCt 2069,
65 Led 2d (1980) (Colville).

Secondary Sources: Monographs
Walkem Ardith & Hallie Bruce, eds, Box of Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section
35 (Vancouver: Theytus, 2003).
Basil Johnston, Ojibway Heritage, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).

99

Chief John Snow, These Mountains Are Our Sacred Places: The Story of the Stoney Indians
(Toronto: Samuel Stevens, 1977).
Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, Administrative Law in Context 3rd ed (Toronto: Edmond
Montgomery, 2018).
Darwin Hanna, Legal Issues on Indigenous Economic Development (Toronto: LexisNexis
Canada, 2017) at 9.
Dean Neu & Richard Therrien, Accounting for Genocide: Canada’s Bureaucratic Assault on
Aboriginal People (Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2003).
EA Heaman, Tax, Order and Good Governance: A New Political History of Canada, 1867-1917
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017).
FW Turner III, ed, The Portable North America Indian Reader (Harmondsworth, England:
Penguin, 1977).
Hansjörg Blöchliger and Junghun Kim, Fiscal Federalism 2016: Making Decentralisation Work
(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016).
H Shewell “Enough to Keep Them Alive”—Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2004).
H Shewell & A Spagnut, “The First Nations of Canada: Social Welfare and the Quest for selfgovernment” in J Dixon & RP Scheurell, eds, Social Welfare with Indigenous Peoples (London:
Routledge, 1995).
Patrick Macklem, “Canadian Constitutional Law” 5th ed (Toronto, Canada: Emond Publishing,
2017).
John J Borrows & Leonard I Rotman, Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials & Commentary,
5th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018).
John FJ Toye & David Lim, Taxation and Economic Development: Twelve Critical Studies, 1st
ed (Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2014).

100

Secondary Sources: Journal Articles, Newspaper Articles, Book Chapters
Art Manuel, “Colonial Oppression at Elsipogtog: Right to self-determination,” West Coast
Native News, (30 October 2013), online:
<https://unsettlingamerica.wordpress.com/2013/10/30/colonial-oppression-at-elsipogtog-rightto-self-determination/>.
“Attawapiskat First Nation versus De Beers Diamond Mine,” The Bullet (2 October 2020),
online: <https://socialistproject.ca/2020/10/attawapiskat-first-nation-vs-debeers-diamondmine/>.
Allison Christians, “Introduction to Tax Policy and Theory” (2018) Social Science Research
Network at 15-16, online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186791>.
Brenda L Gunn, "Overcoming Obstacles to Implementing the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples in Canada" (2013) 31:1 Windsor YB Access Just 147.
Brenda Gunn, “Legislation and Beyond: Implementing and Interpreting the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 53:4 UBC L Rev.
“Canada votes

‘no’ as UN native rights declaration passes”, CBC (13 September 2007), online:<
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-votes-no-as-un-native-rights-declaration-passes1.632160>.
“Canada endorses indigenous rights declaration”, CBC (12 November 2010), online:
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-endorses-indigenous-rights-declaration-1.964779>.
Chris Sprysak, "Aboriginal Taxation Update: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going?"
in 2007 Prairie Provinces Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2007), 13:1-24,
online: <https://taxfind.ca/#/document/2007_ppc_paper_13>.
Gina van den Burg, “The Absence of Democracy in Aboriginal Self-Government Policy” 2009
6:1 Federal Governance 1 at 7.
“Half of First Nations Children on reserve live in poverty, new study says,” APTN National
News (09 June 2019), online: <https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/half-of-first-nationschildren-on-reserve-live-in-poverty-new-study-says/>.
Isabelle Montpetit, “Background: The Indian Act”, CBC (14 July 2011) online:
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/background-the-indian-act-1.1056988>.

101

Jacques Poitras, “Higgs government pulls out of gas-tax sharing with First Nations”, CBC (13
April 2021), online: < https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/department-of-financeblaine-higgs-1.5985206>.
John Paul Tasker, “Residential School findings point to ‘cultural genocide,’ commission chair
says’ CBC (29 May 2015), online: < https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/residential-schoolsfindings-point-to-cultural-genocide-commission-chair-says-1.3093580>.
Joseph Gill, Judith Charbonneau Kaplan, and Nicole Watson, "First Nations Tax Issues with a
Business Focus," in 2018 Prairie Provinces Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 2018), 6:1-28, online: <https://taxfind.ca/#/document/2018_ppc_paper_6>.
J Peter Ranson, “The Evolution of Aboriginal Tax Exemptions: The Past, Present, and the
Future” in Report of Proceedings of Fifty-Seventh Tax Conference, 2005 Conference Report
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2006) 24:1-48 at 2, online:
<https://taxfind.ca/#/document/2005_cr_paper_24>.
John Borrows, “Introduction” in Borrows et al, eds, Braiding Legal Orders: Implementing the
United Nations Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (Montreal: Centre for
International Governance Innovation, 2019).
Keith Borkowsky, Conservative governments voice concerns over Bill C-15, Toronto Star (18
January 2021), online: < https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2021/01/18/conservativegovernments-voice-concerns-over-bill-c-15.html>.
Jonathan R Kesselman, “Aboriginal Taxation of Non-Aboriginal Residents: Representation,
Discrimination, and Accountability in the Context of First Nations Autonomy” (2000) 48:5
Canadian Tax Journal 1525 at 1533-34, online:
<https://taxfind.ca/#/document/2000_ctj_paper_5_1525>.
Larry Chartrand et al, “Preface” in John Borrows et al, eds, Braiding Legal Orders:
Implementing the United Nations Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (Montreal:
Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019).
Lee Harding, “First Nations Tax Exemptions Aren’t Helping Aboriginals, Yet They Cost Over
$1 Billion”, Financial Post (13 July 2017), online: < https://financialpost.com/opinion/firstnations-tax-exemptions-arent-helping-aboriginals-yet-they-cost-over-1-billion>.
Marie-Danielle Smith, “Dozens of bills, including on sexual assault and UNDRIP, die in Senate
amid Conservative filibuster”, National Post (21 June 2019), online:
<https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/dozens-of-bills-including-on-sexual-assault-and-undripdie-in-senate-amid-conservative-filibuster>.
102

Michael Coyle, "From Consultation to Consent: Squaring the Circle" (2016) 67 UNBLJ 235.
Paul Oldham & Miriam Anne Frank, “‘We the Peoples…’ the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2008) 24:2 Anthropology Today 5 online: <
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20179902>.
Piotr Wilk, Alana Maltby & Martin Cook, “Residential schools and the effects on Indigenous
health and well-being in Canada—a scoping review” Public Health Rev 38:8 (2017), online:
<https://publichealthreviews.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40985-017-0055-6>.
Richard M. Bird, "Policy Forum: Equalization and Canada's Fiscal Constitution," (2018), vol
66:4 Canadian Tax Journal, 847-869 at 850, online:
<https://taxfind.ca/#/document/2018_ctj_paper_4_847>.
Robert C. Strother, "Sources of Aboriginal Tax Exemption Outside the Indian Act," in Report of
Proceedings of Forty-Fifth Tax Conference, 1993 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1994), 56:1-20, online: <https://taxfind.ca/#/document/1993_cr_paper_56>.
Sheryl Lightfoot, “Using Legislation to Implement the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples” in John Borrows et al, eds, Braiding Legal Orders: Implementing the
United Nations Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (Montreal: Centre for
International Governance Innovation, 2019).
Stephen Allen, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Limits of the
International Legal Project” in Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki, eds, Reflections on the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2011).
Stephen Cornell & Joseph P Kalt, “About the Harvard Project, The Harvard Project on American
Indian Economic Development”, (2016), online: <https://hpaied.org/about>.
Tanis Fiss, “The Lost Century Moving Aboriginal Policy from the 19th Century to the 21st”,
Canadian Taxpayers Federation (November 2002) , online: <
https://www.taxpayer.com/media/26.pdf>.
Vern Krishna, “The Fiscal Landscape: Part 1” (2018) 28:5 Can Current Tax 37.
W. Graham Allen, "Taxation Aspects of the Sechelt Agreement-in-Principle" (2000)
48:6 Canadian Tax Journal 1817-1828, online:
<https://taxfind.ca/#/document/2000_ctj_paper_6_1817>.

103

Secondary Sources: Government Documents, International Materials &
Other
Bill C-10, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014, (assented to 6
November 2014), SC 2014, c 23.
Bill C-15, An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (assented to 21 June 2021).
Bill C-115, An Act to Amend the Indian Act (Designated Lands), SC 1988.
Bill C-641, An Act to ensure that the laws of Canada are in harmony with the United Nations
Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014 (first Reading 4
December 2014).
Bill C-262, An Act to ensure that the laws of Canada are in harmony with the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2016 (as passed by the
House of Commons 30 May 2018).
British Columbia, Bill-77, Indian Land Tax Cooperation Act, 3rd Sess, 34th Parl 1989.British
Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 34th Parl, 3rd Sess, (13 July 1989) at 8538 (Hon Mr.
Weisgerber).
British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 34th Parl, 3rd Sess, (13 July 1989) at 8539.
Canada, Backgrounder: Bill C-15 – United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples Act, online: < https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/declaration/about-apropos.html>.
Canada, Department of Indian Affairs, Income Assistance Program National Manual (Ottawa:
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2005).
Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern development, Statement of the Government
of Canada on Indian Policy (The White Paper), 1969.
Canada, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, The Government of
Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal
Self-Government, (Policy) online: Government of Canada <www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1539869205136#PartI>.

104

Canada, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Canada, online: < https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1450124405592/1529106060525>.
Canada, Indigenous Services Canada: Annual Report to Parliament 2020, online: <
https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1602010609492/1602010631711#chp3>.
Canada, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, Funding Approaches, online:
<https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1322746046651/1322746652148>.
Canada, Mark L Stevenson & Albert Peeling, “Executive Summary of Memorandum Re
Canada’s Comprehensive Claims Policy”, online:
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INAN/Brief/BR9225222/brexternal/StevensonLMark-e.pdf>.
Canada, National Funding Agreement Models 2021-2022: Comprehensive Funding Agreement
(with year grant) 2021-2022 Online: <https://www.sacisc.gc.ca/eng/1607871542349/1607871577300>.
Canadian Poverty Institute, Poverty in Canada, online:
<https://www.povertyinstitute.ca/poverty-canada>.
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Restructuring the Relationship,
vol 2 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1996).
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Canada’s Residential Schools:
The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, vol 1 (Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015).
Canada, Department of Justice, Principles Respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship
with Indigenous Peoples, (2018), online: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/principles.pdf>.
Canada Revenue Agency, Interpretation Bulletin, IT-064503117, “Indian Act Bands” (July 27,
2016).
Canada’s Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (12 November 2010), online: <https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142>.
Canada, What we Learned, report: online: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/declaration/wwlcna/index.html#s1>.

105

Canada, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, A New Approach: CoDevelopment of a New Fiscal Relationship Between Canada and First Nations (2017), online: <
https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-ACH/STAGING/textetext/reconciliation_new_fiscal_rel_approach_1512565483826_eng.pdf>.
Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future
Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015,
online:
<http://www.trc.ca/assets/pdf/Honouring_the_Truth_Reconciling_for_the_Future_July_23_2015
.pdf>.
Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, What We Have Learned: Principles of
Truth and Reconciliation, Vol 6 (McGill-Queen’s University’s Press, 2015), online: <
http://www.trc.ca/assets/pdf/Principles%20of%20Truth%20and%20Reconciliation.pdf>.
Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, Final Report of the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations UNESCOR, 34th Sess, GE 81-166790 (1981).
Diana M Jones, First Nations and the Canadian State: Autonomy and Accountability in the
Building of Self-Government (LLM Thesis), (Carleton University, 1998).
Douglas R Eyford, “A New Direction: Advancing Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2015), online:
<https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAMTAG/STAGING/texte-text/eyford_newDirection-report_april2015_1427810490332_eng.pdf>.
First Nations Finance Authority, History, Mission and Mandate, online: <
https://www.fnfa.ca/en/about/mission-and-purpose/>.
First Nations’ Tax Commission, “30th Anniversary of Bill C-115”, First Nations Tax
Commission (20 July 2018), online: < https://fntc.ca/30th-anniversary-of-bill-c-115/>.
Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law: A Short History, online:
<https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/international-human-rights-law-short-history>.
GAOR, 61st session, 107th plenary meeting, 13 September 2007, UN Doc A/61/PV.107.
Garth Stevenson, “Federalism in Canada” in The Canadian Encyclopedia (7 February 2006),
online: <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/federalism>.

106

Harvey A McCue, “Reserves” in The Canadian Encyclopedia (31 May 2011), online: <
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/aboriginal-reserves>.
House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 245 (5 December 2017).
House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 257 (5 February 2018).
House of Commons Debates, 43rd Parl, 2nd Sess, No 060 (17 February 2021).
Hayden King & Shiri Pasternak, Canada’s emerging Indigenous Rights Framework: A Critical
Analysis, Yellowhead Institute, Special Report, 5 June 2018, online:
<https://yellowheadinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/yi-rights-report-june-2018-final5.4.pdf>.
Indigenous Corporate Training Inc, Indian Residential Schools (18 April 2012), online: <
https://www.ictinc.ca/indian-residential-schools>.
International Law Association, Rights of Indigenous Peoples Committee, “Interim Report”,
Report of the Seventy-Fourth Conference, The Hague (2012) 834.
James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapportuer on the rights of indigenous peoples, Addendum,
the situation of indigenous peoples in Canada, UNHRC, 27th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/27/52/Add.2
(2014).
Jon Tattrie, “Edward Cornwallis” (January 13, 2008) in The Canadian Encyclopedia, online: <
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/edward-cornwallis>.
John Leonard Taylor, Treaties and Historical Research Centre Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada 1985, Treaty Research Report Treaty Six (1876), online: < https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAM-TAG/STAGING/textetext/tre6_1100100028707_eng.pdf>.
John Gailus & Caitlin E Mason, “Property Taxation as an Effective Tool of Self Government”
(2013) Devlin Gailus Barristers and Solicitors, online: <http://www.dgwlaw.ca/web/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/Aboriginal_Taxation_Paper.pdf>.
“John Borrows, Policy Paper: Implementing Indigenous Self-Determination Through Legislation
in Canada” (20 April 2017), online: < https://www.afn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2017-0420-Implementing-Indigenous-self-determination-through-policy-legislation.pdf>.

107

JR Miller, “Residential Schools in Canada” in The Canadian Encyclopedia (10 October 2012),
online: < https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/residential-schools>.
Laura Barnett, Legal and Legislative Affairs, Library of Parliament, Canada’s Approach to the
Treaty-Making Process, online: <
https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/200845E>.
Les Malezer, Chair of the Global Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus, welcoming the adoption of the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in a statement to the 61st
session of the UN General Assembly on September 13, 2007.
Liberal Party of Canada, The UN Declaration On The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, online:
<https://liberal.ca/our-platform/the-un-declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples/>.
Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, Communication No 167/1984 (26 March 1990), UN Doc Supp
No 40 (A/45/40) at 1, online: <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/session45/167-1984.htm>.
Manitoba, The Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission, The Justice System and
Aboriginal People: Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, vol 1 (Winnipeg:
Queen’s Printer, 1991).
Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Carolyn Bennett, “Announcement of Canada’s
Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (Statement
delivered at the 15th Session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 10
May 2016).
Migeul Alfonso Martinez, UN Special Rapportuer on Treaties, Agreements and Other
Constructive Arrangements Between States and Indigenous Populations, Study on Treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements between States and Indigenous populations:
final report (Geneva: UN, June 1999), online: <
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/276353?ln=en>.
Naithan Lagace & Niigaanwewidam James Sinclair, The Canadian Encyclopedia, The White
Paper, 1969 (24 September 2015), online: <
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/the-white-paper-1969>.
Nisgaa Nation, Understanding the Treaty: Nisga’a Lisims Government, online: <
https://www.nisgaanation.ca/understanding-treaty>.
Prime Minister of Canada, News Release, “Prime Minister announces Working Group of
Ministers on the Review of Laws and Policies Related to Indigenous Peoples” (22 February

108

2017), online: < https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2017/02/22/prime-minister-announcesworking-group-ministers-review-laws-and>.
Report of the Global Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus Steering Committee (31 August 2007) online:
<https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/social_justice/declaration/screport_07083
1.pdf>.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of
Indigenous people, HRC, 12th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34 (2009).
René R Gadacz, “Potlash” in The Canadian Encyclopedia (7 February 2006), online: <
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/potlatch>.
Robert Bish et al, “First Nation Property Tax, Services and Economic Development in British
Colubmia”(2014), online:
<https://www.uvic.ca/hsd/publicadmin/assets/docs/BBish/FirstNationTaxationServicesEcDevRe
vised.pdf>.
Robert L Bish, “Property Taxation and the Provision of Government Services on Indian Reserves
in British Columbia” (1987), Centre for Public Sector Studies School of Public Administration,
online:
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f32d90f7ffc124f3a797d0f/t/5f5161fde6617e2fc9ae4b75/
1599169022261/BISH_taxation_and_services.pdf>.
Robert L Bish, Eric G Clemens & Hector G Topham, “Indian Government Taxes and Services in
British Columbia: Alternatives Under Bill C-115 and Bill 64 (1991), online: <
https://www.uvic.ca/hsd/publicadmin/assets/docs/BBish/taxes_services.pdf>.
Robin Boadway & Ronald Watts, “Fiscal Federalism in Canada”, (2000) Institute of
Intergovernmental Relations working paper, online:
<https://www.queensu.ca/iigr/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.iigrwww/files/files/WorkingPapers/w
atts/WattsFiscalFederalismCanada2000.pdf>.
Russell A Evans, “Budgeting Practices in Canadian First Nations Settings: A Study of the
Persistence of Arbitrary-set Social Hierarchies”, online:
<https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/tedrogersschool/cpao-symposium/Budgeting-Practices-inCanadian-First-Nations-Settings-Evans.pdf>.
Shirlee Anne Smith, “Rupert’s Land” in The Canadian Encyclopedia (7 February 2006), online:
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/ruperts-land>.

109

Siegfried Wiessner, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, online: <
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_61-295/ga_61-295_e.pdf>.
“Sufficiency: Comparability and Various Institutional or Other Arrangements to Support New
Approaches to Comparability” (2017), Assembly of First Nations, online: <
https://www.afn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Comparability-Report.pdf>.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR,
61st Sess. Annex, UN Doc A/Res/61/295 (2007).
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariate, From Red Tape to Clear Results—The Report of the
Independent Blue Ribbon Panel on Grant and Contribution Programs, December 2006.
TrueNorthAid’s educational material at TrueNorthAid, online: <https://truenorthaid.ca>.
United Nations, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, online:
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-ofindigenous-peoples.html>.
United Nations, Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations, online:
<https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/about-us.html>.
United Nations, Historic Overview, online:
<https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-ofindigenous-peoples/historical-overview.html>.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A(III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13,
UN Doc A/810 (1948).
Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Report of the Special Rapportuer of the Human Rights Council on the
rights of indigenous peoples, UNGA, 72nd Sess, UN Doc A/72/186 (2017).
Yellow Head Institute, Cash Back (2021), online: <https://cashback.yellowheadinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/Cash-Back-A-Yellowhead-Institute-Red-Paper.pdf>.
“What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?”, Amnesty International UK (21 October
2017), online: <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/universal-declaration-human-rights-UDHR>.
William B Henderson, “Indian Act” in The Canadian Encyclopedia (2006), online:
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/indian-act>.

110

Wendy Moss & Elain Gardner-O’Toole, Law and Government Division November 1987,
Aboriginal Peoples: History of Discriminatory Laws, online:
<http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp175e.htm#2.%20Restricted%20Right%20to%20Sell%20Agricultural%20Products(txt)>.

111

